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INTRODUCTION
Today, technology is seen as one of the primary sources
of national power, and prosperity. Some would just say
technology is power.
Just how powerful is technology?
Although an exact measure is not possible (and not
necessary), a comparative look at how high a stake is placed
on technology by a country that needs it, and by a country
that possesses it would certainly reveal the picture.
China and the united States would be the two
illustrative countries in such a picture. This thesis will
explore the transfer of technology from the united States to
China by examining the policy and legal frameworks in each
country. Such exploration will serve dual purposes: to
acquaint Chinese purchasers and American sellers* with each
other's policy and legal issues pertaining to technology
transfer.
The first chapter will examine the policy and legal
framework of China governing its import of technology.
China's technology background, its current technology needs,
the problems involved in its import and absorption of
foreign technology will also be discussed.
Major laws and regulations governing the Chinese import
of technology are also analyzed. The protection of
1
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intellectual property will be dealt with at the end of the
chapter.
Chapter two has a similar structure to chapter one. The
United states technology policy framework will be examined
first. Under this framework, the control on exports to
Communist countries will be discussed generally, and then us
technology policy towards China will be discussed
specifically, from early embargo on trade with China to the
current us technology policy towards China.
The us legal framework governing export control is
examined next. This will describe the operation mechanism of
export control, with emphasis on regulations and provisions
relating to technology export to China. Two major laws-the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended in 1985, and
the Export Administration Regulations will be analyzed in
detail. The multilateral control mechanism-the Coordinating
Committee (CoCom) will also be discussed at the end of
chapter because of its significant role in multilateral
control of exports to the Communist countries, which include
China.
The third and last chapter will focus on the technology
transfer contract, which is the legal instrument to actually
effectuate a transfer. Again, it is examined from both
policy and legal perspectives. The successful negotiation of
a technology contract between the Chinese and the American~
depends a lot not only on the understanding of each other's
law and policy, but also on the understanding of each
3other's negotiation styles and contractual practice.
However, since most such contracts are negotiated and signed
in China, only the Chinese negotiation styles and
contractual practice are presented for the understanding of
American sellers. A clause-by-clause analysis is further
contained in this chapter to show the details in the
negotiation.
* Note: In this thesis, "seller(s)", "exporter(s)", "licen-
sores)", are used interchangeably, so are "buyer(s)",
"purchaser(s)", and "importer(s)".
CHAPTER I
THE IMPORTATION OF TECHNOLOGY BY CHINA
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will first trace the history of the
development of technology in China and the importation of
technology by China, followed by a description of China's
current objectives for importing foreign technology. It
will then specifically identify China's needs for
technology, its policies and problems in buying and
absorbing such foreign technology. The Chinese legal
framework for facilitating its technology import will be
discussed next, and finally, the issue of protecting
intellectual property will be explored. The effects of the
Tienanman Square Massacre on China's on-going technology
import will also be discussed.
A. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE
In his "Report on the Work of the Government" presented
to the National People's Congress (NPC) in Beijing, former
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai announced what was to become the
foremost national goal of the People's Republic of China -
4
5achieving the modernization of China's agriculture,
industry, science and technology, and the national defense
industry by the end of this century. 1 The time was
January, 1975 - less than two years before the official
ending of the Cultural Revolution.2 Although there have
been many changes in various policies since then (the
current goal set for the end of this century is to be
quadruple the 1980 industrial and agricultural output by
2000), the national goal in the long term has remained the
achievement of the Four Modernizations. The drive to import
foreign technology is only one part of the many mechanisms
centered around this goal.
However, to understand the current Chinese technology
import policy, we must look back into history.
1. Before the opium War of 1840
Recent Chinese history has been characterized by its
ambivalence toward the outside world, especially when
foreigners here sought to participate in its trade.3 It
has moved from extreme autarky to tentative
internationalism. 4
Because of her vast area and diversity of abundant
resources, feudal China was able to be self-sufficient. The
"Great Four Inventions,,5 and many other artifacts and
techniques, 6 once made China a prosperous and powerful
empire that did not see much value in trading with alien
6"barbarians".7 To the Emperor Qian Long of the Qing
DynastyB proudly replied George III when he requested to
trade with the British empire,
"we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or
ingenious •.. ,,9
However, the stubborn closing-door tradition had been
occasionally flirted by adventurers from the West. Among
them, Marco Polo, son of a Venice merchant, was perhaps
among the earliest and the best known Western adventurers to
China. He came by the famous Silk Road10 and was so liked
by the Mongolian Emperor Genghis Khan11 that he was
appointed governor of a famous Southern Chinese city - Yang
Zhou. Marco Polo wrote and introduced Chinese technologies
and her richness to his countrymen, who were so amazed that
they would not believe him. However, as time passed,
Western countries gradually began to see the value of
trading with China. First came the Jesuits who brought
Western technology such as Western clocks and the spinet.12
Instead of introducing Chinese technology to his own country
as Marco Polo had done, in 1632 Johann Adam Schall Von Bell
used astronomical and mathematical calculations to help the
Chinese update their artillery. 13
However, von Bell as well as other Jesuits followed him
failed to approach China through demonstration of technical
expertise. Von Bell was later convicted of treason.14
Later missionaries were also expelled. China still remained
virtually closed and refused to trade with foreigners.
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At the same time, beyond the door of China, Europe was
going through the Industrial Revolution. Technology and
productivity boomed. Even at its early developmental stage
capitalism had sought to expand outward. After major Western
powers had gradually colonized virtually all of the world
market, the large Chinese market was still unaffected and
continuing to operate in a self-sufficient and slow
Confucian manner.
Almost inevitably, Western powers turned to China.
First came the British, who were not satisfied with the
small-scale, sporadic trade with China. When the trading of
goods could not reduce their trade deficit with Imperial
China, the British brought with them opium and cannon. The
British opium not only switched the trade deficit from the
British side to the side of China, it also poisoned
generations of Chinese.15 When the Chinese began to reject
the opium, the British brought cannon with them and forced
the Qing Dynasty to open the door. As a result, although the
door was still not completely open, five ports16 were
opened as windows for commerce with foreign merchants. The
breakout of the Opium war in 1840 therefore led China into a
century of humiliation.
The defeat of the Chinese empire by the industrialized
Great Britain and France reflected, from the perspective of
technology, the cultural and historical contrasts between
China and Europe. In China, the development of technology
was not associated with fundamental changes in social order.
8It only provided a secure foundation for the governing elite
and the civilization they created. "Merchants remained
politically and culturally subordinate,,17 to the Mandarin
elite and this prevented the rise of new classes
(capitalists) that could threaten the existing social order.
"New ways of doing things did not alter customary social and
political arrangements ... the Confucian culture was deemed
more valuable than the products of a new technology". 18
Such a culture could only help to retard technological
progress.
However, the literary and theoritical nature of the
elite culture "centered on learning the correct principles
of human relationships, and using these principles for the
,
maintenance of harmony, both between man and man, and man
and nature. ,,19 In contrast, the practically minded spirit
pervaded in Europe after the Renaissance. Such a spirit not
only provoked the desire of man to conquer nature, but this
desire further spurred the Industrial Revolution and
numerous new technologies that iprovided satisfaction to
such a desire.
A culture that is not favorable for trial, experiment
and change is the best warmbed for bureaucracy and
corruption, since bureaucracy is always perfectly satisfied
with the traditional ways of doing things. When a culture
is not favorable to experiment and development, the elites
and bureaucrats would not seek to change the social order,
but would naturally go the corrupt ways. Perhaps the best
9illustration of such bureaucracy and corruption was the
Empress Dowager' s "marble navy, ,,20 when the Empress
Dowager embezzled the money for building a navy to deter
foreign invasion and used it for constructing the famous
Summer Palace for her, which was later burned down by the
British and French army, leaving an unbuilt Chinese navy.
In summary, to say today's backwardness of China was
due to its less developed technology is perhaps not
accurate. It is more accurate to say that such backwardness
was caused by a feudal culture that was not conducive to the
development of technology beyond a degree that satisfies the
immediate needs of the governing elite. This is perhaps why
China once brought to the world the "Great Four Inventions"
when it ,was progressing toward a powerful feudal empire,
because there was room for these technology. However, once
the needs of the feudal elites were satisfied, there were no
more stimulant for development. Therefore, after the
Industrial Revolution in Europe, technological progress and
productivity flourished in Europe and North America, China
was left far behind.
2. A Century of Humiliation, 1840-1949
During this period, China was open to the west.
However, that opening "was not in the least voluntary. ,,21
It was in this period that foreign technology added a new
meaning in the eyes of the Chinese - that it was seen by
traditionalists as "means for subjugation, militarily and
10
economically. ,,22 It was also in this period that
"modernizers,,23 realized that China must have advanced
technology to become independent and strong.
After the Opium War, a series of unequal treaties were
signed between China and the Western powers which put
Western power in dominant position in China. Chinese mines,
railways and harbors were developed by foreign engineers and
controlled by foreign countries. Chinese customs were also
in foreign hands. A foreign jUdiciary and constabulary
enforced foreign laws in China's major port cities; massive
taxation were imposed to satisfy foreign lenders.24
Such situation continued for a period of time even
after the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of
the Republ~c of China. Disappointing to the early
republicans (the revolutionists), foreign influences still
dominated China. A China after the fall of the emperor soon
fell into "chaos and confusion". 25 The dream of the 1911
Revolution fell prey to warlords from inside, and Japanese
and other foreign powers from outside.
The foreign invaders also brought with them certain
technologies. Technically, the entry of foreign technology
into China during this period exposed China to new
technologies and this should spur the Chinese technology
development. However, technologies so entered were majorly
controlled by foreigners and used for the benefits of
foreign merchants. They were used as tools to exploit
natural resources from China, which shaped China's economy
11
into a colonial economy. As a result, China's economy became
more dependent and vulnerable.
3. Policy Changes After 1949
Mao Zedong declared the birth of the People's Republic
of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949. The new China "sought to
achieve liberation from the ravages of feudalism and war
without succumbing to the evils of capitalism and
imperialism" .26 High priority was set on building an
economically strong China.27 To achieve this, Chinese
leaders realized that they could not totally rely on their
own hands, even though self-reliance and independence were
stressed at the very beginning. China had to use foreign
technologies, as Chairman Mao said, China should "make
foreign things serve China."
At the beginning, however, Chinese leaders maintained
that technology is part of the "universal human heritage
which should be shared by all countries" .28 Also, because
of the bad colonial experiences in the past, Chinese leaders
were too concerned about sovereignty and independence
while importing foreign technologies, especially Western
technologies. 29
As a result, foreign technology (except technology from
the Soviet) played only a minor role in China's early
reconstruction. However, Chinese leaders today finally
recognized the following benefits of using foreign
technology:
12
1) by importing foreign technology and raising the
technology level of China, foreign technology can contribute
to greater national technology self-reliance;
2) foreign technology can also help accelerate
technical transformation of old Chinese enterprises which
were equipped by Western powers before 1949 or soviet
experts in the 50's;
3) it can assist in the expansion of exports by raising
the quantity and quality of products;
4) importing foreign advanced technology may also
shorten the time, cost, and risk of domestic research
programs, which can also be the reason to import technology
by even the most advanced country like the united states;
5) it ~ay provide opportunities for gaining project
management experience, another weak area in today's Chinese
economy; and
6) it may serve as a context for training technical
workers, which are in severe shortage in China.3o
Although the need to import foreign technology is
recognized at all times since 1949, there has never been a
uniform technology import policy. In fact, there has never
been an overall plan covering technology import all through
the time.31 Even in one period of time, there may be more
than one policies. As one author noted, "at anytime,
technology policy is really a cluster of separate policies
which reflect the differential impact of general policies on
specific sectors of the economy". 32 Nevertheless, the
13
evolvement of Chinese technology import policies can be
separated into several periods, each having a dominant
policy theme.
(a) 1950-60
This period saw a large scale of technology transfer
from the Soviet Union. These transferred technologies were
to support 156 major Chinese industrial projects which
include such basic industries as metallurgy, machine
building, trucks, coal mining, electric power and petroleum.
Some 400 items of technology were introduced with an
approximate value of $2.66 billion.33 The massive
technology ~ssistance to China from the Soviet in this
period is regarded as "undoubtedly the most comprehensive
transfer in modern industrial history". 34 One salient
feature of the Soviet technology transfer to China was that
a wealth of know-how, experts and advisory services were
also provided to China along with technical equipments.35
However, the Soviet Union abruptly withdrew all its
aids to China in 1960,36 which left many Chinese projects
unfinished, and put China in an almost helpless situation
since all the Western world countries were embargoing trade
with China at that time.37
Chinese authorities learned a bitter lesson from this.
They began to realize the problem of overly relying on one
single country's technology. Before the Soviet withdrawal,
China carried the policy of "self-reliance" while "leaning
14
on one side" (meaning relying only on one country).38
However, the Great Leap Forward (1958-59)39 shortly before
the Soviet-China split advocated "walking on two legs"
instead of "leaning on one side". 40 Although the Soviet
technical assistance had greatly increased China's
industrial output, the Stalinist strategy of economic
development was in fact ill-suited to China's developmental
needs.41 China has a large rural population42 and
agriculture demands large investment. However, under the
Soviet sponsorship, less than 8% of State budget were
invested in agriculture during the First Five-Year Plan
(1953-57 Fyp)43 while 20-25% of the country's total output
went into heavy industry investment.44 As a result,
China's economy remained mainly an agricultural one.
However, without the follow-up of the agriculture, China's
industrialization would seem far away, if possible at all.
(b) 1960-66
In this era, although self-reliance continued to be
maintained, in foreign trade area, China began to "lean to
all sides" ("walking on two legs") after the painful lesson
from the Soviet withdrawal. "Self-reliance" and "leaning to
all sides" are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. "Self-
reliance" is to avoid dependence on one or more country;
"leaning to all sides" is to help achieve the purpose of
self-reliance. This is why China at that same time was
proclaiming the slogan of "maintaining independence, keeping
15
the initiative in our own hands, and relying on
oursel ves" •45
In this period, China apparently began to turn toward
Japan and Western Europe for technology. Slight improvement
in relations with the West and Japan had made it possible
for China to buy products, although hardly technology,46
from Japan and the West. Some 84 major contracts worth $280
million were signed in this period, ranging from metallurgy,
chemicals to synthetic textiles. 47 "For the first time
China could reasonably hope to tap the resources of both the
industrial democracies and the Soviet bloc, and in contrast
to the 1950's, policies were formulated to ensure that China
would not become heavily dependent on a single nation". 48
(c) 1966-78
The ten-year Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
(1966-76) did almost every possible damage to Chinese
science and technology as well as its economy as a whole.
According to one statistic, "national income produced per
100 yuan49 of fixed assets averaged 34 yuan during the
1976-79 period, compared with 52 yuan during the First Five-
Year Plan. Over one-third of all state owned enterprises
were running at a loss in 1976. ,,50
Fortunately enough, despite domestic turmoil and the
pervalence of xenophobia and extreme self-reliance pervaded
in this period, foreign technology continue to be imported
when necessary (albeit on smaller scale). This was
16
motivated, or more exactly, forced by the government's need
to provide job for people and to feed the huge population
(thus to maintain its control) .51
In the early 70's, the concept of self-reliance was
reinterpreted, as Deng Xiao-ping declared in his famous
speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 1974:
"self-reliance in no way means 'self-seclusion' and
rejection of foreign aid" .52 This signaled the ending of
~elf-seclusion under the slogan of "self-reliance".
Also, the normalization of relationship between China
and other Western countries in the early 70's brought more
technology contracts between China and these countries.
However, in most of the 70's, more products were imported
than technoloqv.53 Relatively few technology was
transferred to China. 54
Another feature of the Chinese technology import in
this period is the import of complete plants and the only
means for transfer was purchasing.55 The disadvantages of
such practices are obvious. Not only were great expenses
incurred, the "whole-plant-transfer" is also not likely to
help raise the levels of domestic research and production,
since usually sellers of technology alone have access to
basic designs and vital aspects of production technology
(know-how), while buyers have no access to such know-how.56
Besides, Chinese users also lacked the management skill for
the purchased plant.
17
Cd) 1978-88
Fundamental changes came after the Fall of the "Gang of
Four,,57in 1976, which marked the end of the Cultural
Revolution. Although the Four Modernizations program was
announced in 1975, due to domestic political campaign and
unrest, it was not seriously pursued by the whole nation
until it was reannounced in 1978. Such a reannouncement
horned the beginning of the New Long March58 by the Chinese
toward a strong socialist China. The Third Plenum of the
Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Congress in 1978 further
adopted a theme of "Adjustment, Reform, Consolidation and
Improvement", which was aimed to rebuild the economy after
the ten-year turmoil.
For the first time in Chinese history, China
voluntarily opened its door to the outside world.
International trade was viewed as a key factor in
transforming the country into a modern industrial state, as
well as a means to meet the goals of the Four
Modernization. 59 A series of major policy decisions were
made in this period. On July, 1979, the Joint Venture Law
was enacted to attract foreign investment by offering
various incentives to foreign investors;60 in 1980, four
areas in Guang Dong Province and Fujian Province were
designated as special economic zones61 wherein foreign
investors may receive special benefits; later, 14 more
coastal cities were approved to be open cities which are
open to foreign investments with special benefits to
18
investors;62 in 1982, the policy of allowing foreign
investments in China was officially penned down in the
Constitution;~ on April 1, 1985, China's first patent law
was enacted to facilitate import of foreign technology.~
All these are major steps of the overall Chinese
economic reform, the significance of which could be regarded
as no less than a second "revolution" in the history of PRC.
As the door is opening wider, more and more foreign
technology will likely come in.
Specificly, the policy of technology import has seen
important changes during the 80's. First, instead of
importing complete plant, priorities for import were
established to import technology for key sectors of Chinese
economy; second, the scope of technology imports was
limited to basic components and materials, complete designs
of factory equipment and key production techniques; third,
means of technology transfer was also expanded to include
licensing, joint venture, or even "bidding".65
However, perhaps because the need for foreign
technology was so desperate, the pace of development had
once stepped too far and too fast, the import of technology
went almost beyond control at the end of 70's. In February,
1978, Premier Hua Guofeng set out an over-ambitious 10-year
economic development plan in his report on the Fifth
National People's Congress (5th NPC).~ This plan
envisioned enormous increases in agricultural output;
increases in the value of industrial output of 10% per year
19
to 1985; the development of transportation,
telecommunication and other 120 large-scale industrial
projects. 67 This plan was exceedingly ambitious and so out
of tune with the reality that the objectives had to be
scaled down in early 1979. As a result of this cooling down,
many projects already contracted with foreign parties were
either postponed, deferred indefinitely or cancelled. The
postponement of the $2 billion Baoshan steel Complex
agreement with Japan was a famous case at that time.~
Such overheating was repeated in 1985, but was cooled down
fairly soon. Later in this period, the slogan of achieving
the Four Modernizations by the year 2000 was also changed to
a goal of quadrupling of the 1980 industrial and
agricultural output by the year 2000. To achieve this not in
the least moderate goal, the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-
1990)69 has set the acquisition of technology as a high
priority, since one of the Four Modernizations is to raise
the level of the Chinese science and technology, and the
Chinese realized that the modernization of the other three
(industry, agriculture and defense) all depend on the
modernization of Chinese technology.70
(e) Tienanmen Massacre and After
China in the past decade has seen unprecedented
openness to the West and tremendous economic growth.
According to Chinese statistics, the total volume of import
and export trade has risen from US $20.64 billion in 1978 to
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US $111.6 billion in 1989 (an annual import growth rate of
17.6% from 1978-88). GNP of 1989 is 1567.7 billion yuan,
comparing to 358.8 billion yuan in 1978.71 However,
economic growth is accompanied by many problems. High
inflation rate (18.5% in 1988, 17.8% in 1989), increased
rate of unemploYment, pervasive official corruption,
inflated prices and a shortage of materials. All these had
been the major causes for the eruption of the pro-democracy
and anti-corruption demonstration in the spring of 1989.
This is the largest pro-democracy demonstration in the PRC's
history and it attracted world media attention for weeks,
because virtually every class of the population, even
soldiers, police and government officials participated.
Unfortunately, the demonstration was bloodily crushed when
Chinese soldiers gunned down hundreds of students at the
Tienanmen Square. This brought great damages to China, both
politically and economically. Foreign investors now either
pulled-out or began to reconsider their investment policy in
China. The West universally deplored the repressive actions
of the Chinese government. Domestically, Chinese government
conducted mass arrests and political purge of reformers
despite the abhorrence of outside world.
The Tienanmen massacre occurred as the world is
stepping into the 90's and coincidentally as China is
transitting from its 7th FYP to 8th FYP. After the Tienanmen
massacre, the political struggle within Chinese government
will intensify. Before the senior leaders enter their
21
graves, the government will be in a period of transition.n
In the interim, the central government will be weak due to
political struggle. And it is too early to predict what will
happen after senior leader Deng Xiao-Ping's death.
Two year have passed after the Tienanmen Square
Massacre. Looking retrospectively, although China had become
politically repressive and still remains the same, its open
door policy and desire to attract foreign investment seem to
be unchanged. Even the General Secretary Jiang Zemin, who
succeeded Deng (at least nominally) became of his tough
stand against pro-democracy demonstration, has said recently
that China will adhere to its opening policy no matter what
changes take place in the international situation and no
matter what difficulties it may encounter; that one task of
the Party and the government is to maintain political
stability at home and another is to keep the country's
economy developing in a steady and balanced way.~ In
announcing the Chinese economic plan for 1990, Zou Jia hua,
Chinese Minister in charge of the State Planning Commission,
also emphasized that opening China to the outside world and
expanding its trade and economic and technological exchanges
with foreign countries are both "long-term, consistent
strategic policies for advancing China's modernization drive
and important measures for overcoming the current economic
difficulties."n
In summary, China's official policy toward the outside
world after Tienanmen Square Massacre has remained
22
unchanged. However, the Massacre has brought great damage to
Chinese economy; therefore 1989-91 will be a period of
"readjustment plan." China is not likely to increase its
imports since China wants to reduce inflation, budget
deficit and to repay the increasing foreign debt.~
Nevertheless, the official "open-door" policy has at least
continued, not abandoned. The resuming of foreign business
operations in the past year also suggests that before long,
all business between China and foreign countries will resume
to normal. 76
B. CHINA'S CURRENT NEEDS FOR TECHNOLOGY, POLICY AND PROBLEMS
Before discussing China's current needs for technology,
it is necessary to note that China's needs for technology
may be subject to change, depending on the change of Chinese
political and economic climate, An example is the change
after
Tienanmen Square Massacre. Of course, during and after the
course of the change, new problems will definitely emerge.
1. Needs for Technology
China's economy is mainly an agricultural one. Its
rural population accounts for 80% of its total 1 billion
people. This means China has to feed 22% of the world
population with only 7% of the world's arable land.IT This
is a tremendous job that can go beyond human imagination,
23
especially given the fact that virtually no industry
(perhaps except mine, textile, railways) existed in China
before 1949. The economy at that time was just like a "blank
sheet of paper".~ Besides, the current Chinese industry
was largely set up in the 50's with the help of the Soviet
and after decades of continuing operation, they have been so
obsolete that according to one report:
"•.. only 20 per cent of the industry in
China can measure up to the standards of
developed countries in the past decades.
Sixty percent are so obsolete that they
need to be replaced or upgraded. This
explains the wide gap between China and
developed countries in econom~
efficiency and productivity."
However, although basically China's overall industry
remains backward, some industries such as defense industries
have developed "pockets of excellence" that can compete in
world markets.80 China has launched its own experimental
communication satellites and has offered to launch foreign
satellites.81 This is so because Chinese defense
industries have always been privileged in investment of
capital and expertise. Today, China is even exporting
technology, 82 and has a fast-growing military arms
exports. Nevertheless, virtually all areas of Chinese
economy needs foreign technology. The needs of a few areas
are so urgent that they demand special discussions.
Chinese economy is severely constrained by its backward
infrastructure industries such as energy, transportation,
communication and telecommunications, and raw materials.
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According to chief of the Technology Import/Export
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and
Trade (MOFERT), these areas will be the "focal points" of
economic development in the 7th FYpD. Therefore they are
also the most attractive areas for foreign technology.
This has proved to be true as China approaches the end
of its 7th FYP. According to a 1990 Chinese statistic, 43.2
percent of the total amount of imported technology were
invested into energy, transportation, telecommunications and
raw materials industry.~
Although China possesses tremendous natural resources,
much of the resources has not been exploited because of the
shortage of technology, capital or expertise. On his
testimony in Congress, Dr. Vaclav Smil pointed out that the
Chinese "may have the oil but they don't have the energy to
bring it where it is needed the most. ,,85 In fact, China
has a gigantic hydroelectric potential, a potential equal to
the total installed electrical capacity of the united
states. However, less than two percent of this potential is
being exploited.u The transportation system is far from
enough to move the one billion people dispersed over an area
of 3.6 million square miles. People and goods are
principally, transported by railways87. Howeverthe present
railway system must be expanded or improved. Roads must be
builtM or widened. Indeed, China's transportation system
is in such poor shape that it is not a question of
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"improving", but a question of developing a complete
transportation infrastructure.~
Communication is also largely underdeveloped or
obsolete, largely because of the vastness of the country and
partly because of the poor transportation system. Before
China launched its first communication satellite, the
northwest X'ing Jiang Urghur Autonomous Region could not
even receive the official TV news the same day when the news
was broadcasted in Beijing. Even today, residence telephone
is undoubtedly a luxury. Only 2.93 million houses are using
telephone by the end of 1987.90
Major raw materials are also in severe shortage. Major
construction material such as steel, cement are in extreme
shortage and their supply is controlled by the state.
Although oil is the most promising resources and the major
export product of China,91 and although Chinese coal
output ranked third after the soviet Union and the United
States,92 the Chinese technology to extract oil and coal
lagged at least 15-20 years behind the West93 and the
outputs are not enough to meet domestic industrial
production.
Besides the need for foreign technology in
infrastructure industries, Chinese agriculture also demands
much foreign technology infusion. China has to import large
amount of food to feed its one billion people each year. The
core issue of agriculture is to raise farm output. This
means new technology must be invested in producing good
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seed, farm machinery, fertilizer and other chemical
products.94
The importance of the development of these areas to the
Chinese economy is fully recognized by today's Chinese
leadership. According to official statistics, 132.4 billion
yuan95 were invested as basic production investment in
1987, among them investment in energy, transportation, raw
material industry accounted for 38%.% During the 6th FYP,
9 billion, or 15 percent of the investment funds in the plan
period, went for foreign technology,97 the majority of
which were spent on technology or equipments in the above
most needed fields.~ Heavy investment in foreign
technology continues to be the trend in China's 7th and 8th
FYP.
2. Current Technology Import Policy and Problems
The current Chinese technology import policy reflected
its present emphasis on key infrastructure industry
technologies, on "pure" technology or know-how instead of
wholeplants. Since the current policy evolved from the
policy after 1978, it has a number of important changes away
from the technology import experiences before 1978. Before
1978, China majorly imported whole-plants and insisted on
the "most advanced technology". Because of its limited
capacity to absorb the most advanced technology, a lot of
highly sophisticated equipments had to lie idle after
purchase because of the lack of expertise to use them.
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Besides, the lack of an overall plan in the 70's resulted in
duplication of purchases. The insistence on the "most
advanced technology" also brought in incompatible equipments
and process which made China almost a "technology
junkyard. 1199
Now China only wants to "buy hen that lay eggs. 11100
Accordingly, a more pragmatic technology import policy was
adopted. In 1979, after a reassessment of prior technology
importation, China announced nine major guidelines to be
followed in acquiring foreign technology in the future:
"1) we must ourselves produce what we
can even if quality and function of our
products are slightly poorer. Of course,
we must strive to carry out technical
innovation and modification to improve
our products' quality, quantity and
function;
"2) after technology is imported, if we
can manufacture the equipment, we must
not buy it abroad;
"3) after key parts of a complete set of
equipment have been imported, if we can
round off the complete set, then
complete sets must not be imported;
"4) after a complete set of equipment
has been imported, if we discover that
we can produce part of the equipment
which measures up to the standard, we
can buy parts of the equipment;
"5) we must work out unified plans for a
products' series and models and
gradually form a series of Chinese
products. We must not import the same
things from many countries, resulting in
an 'international brand';
"6) we can hire foreign specialists to
help us design and build complicated and
comparatively large-scale equipment.
They can also help us for some time
after it is built, until we have the
technical personnel to run it;
"7) we must use all types of foreign
advisory organizations and ask them to
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provide us with technical information
and suggestions from which we can make a
selection;
"8) importing technological patents and
equipment must be reported to
departments concerned in our country.
Some must be used in a unified way or in
common. They cannot be monopolized by
anyone, to prevent other units from
reimporting them; and
"9) while importing technology, we must
organize the necessary science and
technological forces to carry out
research to insure that we can make
copies and our own creations. ,,101
These nine guidelines were later boiled down to a
general policy. According to Ren Jian Xin,102 China should
import only technology that would "serving the purpose of
producing benefits to the sector of national economy which
enjoys priority in investment". 103 In summary, China
should (1) adopt what is best in foreign countries; (2)
import advanced technology, but technology that would (3)
develop foreign trade; (4) utilize foreign investment; and
(5) expand foreign economic cooperation and technological
exchange. 104
One of the most important changes in current technology
import has been the great increase in the number of
technologies imported to upgrade or renovate the existing
enterprises, as opposed to the past emphasis on importing
new enterprises or importing technology to support new
enterprises. 105
Administratively, as part of a decentralization
strategy, local governments, enterprises and new trading
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corporations have more authority in the technology import
decision-making. Central ministries and a single foreign
trade corporation are no longer the principal entities to
decide what technology to import.106 This gives local
entities more freedom and flexibility, but such
decentralization has not been achieved without problems.107
Internationally, after learning a lesson from the
withdrawal of soviet technicians and in an effort to "walk
on two legs", China intentionally diversified its
international technology relations. 108 Although China has
a preference for us technology, 109 China also purchases
technology from Western Europe and Japan when us export is
prohibited by its export control law. In recent years,
China expanded its technology relations with the USSR and
the Eastern Europe, despite the harsh memories of the past.
An agreement on economic and technological cooperation was
reached between China and the USSR on December 28, 1984.110
Such a diversification policy has the effects of reaping
political benefits; avoiding dependence on a single
supplier; and taking advantage of greed and competition in
the international market placelll It will put China in a
more secure position in terms of technology supply.
The intent of avoiding dependence on one single
supplier is also consistent with the principle of self-
reliance and sovereignty, which is always highly regarded by
the Chinese. As one author noted, although "the Chinese
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leadership has developed a strong infatuation with the
concept of 'New Technology Revolution' ..• At the same time,
China has not waned [sic] in its commitment to the principle
of increased technology self-reliance. ,,112
Methodologically, the ways to acquire technology have
also been expanded from mere purchase of plants, reverse
engineering113 and trade fairs114 to including
transferring through licensing, joint venture, training of
students and technicians, joining and hosting international
scientific and technological organizations and conventions.
In terms of technological orientation, the scope of
technology imported had been broadened to include:
industrial property rights and other proprietary technology;
machinery and equipment; technical services; documentation;
know-how; as well as management and marketing expertise.
Legally, to better regulate technology import
activities, a number of new laws, regulations have also been
enacted since the "Open Door" pOlicy. This is part of the
drive to achieve what is termed "the fifth modernization -
the strengthening of the socialist legal system and the
building of legal institutions".115 Between 1979 and
1988, China has promulgated over 420 laws, regulations and
other acts, of which over 330 are economic laws and
regulations. 116 Two regulations are specifically related
to the importation of technology: Regulations on
Administration of Technology Import Contracts of the
People's Republic of China; and Regulations on
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Administration of Technology Import Contracts. (These two
regulations will be discussed later).
Domestically, there is a growing linkage between
civilian and military sectors. 117 Defense industries have
long enjoyed privileged budget, personnel and resources, and
had formed "pockets of excellence". Presently, attention
has been given to transferring military technology to
civilian enterprises. 118 The "012 Enterprise Group", an
industrial complex of the aviation industry located in
Shanxi Province, has begun to produce not only aircraft, but
also light industrial goods (such as copy machine)., home
appliances and farm machinery. 119 Defense related Ministry
of Electronics has also greatly increased its role in
machinery and electronical products exports as a move to
link the military and civilian industries. 120
Transferring defense technology to civilian enterprises
can be seen as a supplemental policy to importing foreign
technology, so are three other similar policies going on in
China. One is the horizontal connection between the eastern
coastal provinces and western inner cities and provinces.
Capital and technology from the East are transferred to the
West, in exchange for the rich natural resources from the
West. 121 By the end of 1987, about 6780 industrial
enterprises above the county level joined such horizontal
economic connections, forming a total of 106 economic
networks; 12.57 billion yuan had been invested; in 1987
alone, 60,000 technology transfer and other economic
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cooperation contracts had been signed. The connection is
associated not only with capital, technology and resources,
but also with management, foreign trade, R & D and
transportation, etc. 122 The second connection is between
research units and production. 123 R & D institutions have
been the major suppliers of technology to domestic
enterprises. In the first half of 1987, the value of
technology transferred by R & D institutions accounts for
38% of all the technology transferred between domestic
units. 124 At the end of 80's, China's S&T policYmakers
began to encourage more co-operation between R&D Institutes
and enterprises. state funds for research institutes are
reduced so that they are forced to increase contract
research to raise revenues. As a result, many high-tech
companies were formed to increase the applications of their
research. For China Academy of Science alone, the amount of
all research results utilized for industrial applications
has reportedly risen to some 50-70 percent at the end of
80's, comparing to only 20 to 40 percent in the early
80 ' s. 125
The third connection is between cities and rural areas.
The present "Sparkle Plan" is intended mainly to introduce
technology in the city to small rural enterprises and farm
production. Thousands of experts were sent to assist rural
development each year. In fact, "Sparkle Plan" is recognized
as one of the six major scientific tasks on a recent
33
national scientific convention, which drew up a middle to
long term national science plan. 126
The Open Door policy after 1979 and China's determined
drive for modernization have brought remarkable results.
During 1981-1984, China had experienced an 11% annual growth
rate. 127 Its exports represented only 0.75 % of world
trade in 1978 but had grown to 1.25% in 1984, moved its rank
in the world export from 32nd to 16th in value of
exports. 128
As to the acquisition of foreign technology, during the
past decades, China has spent approximately $27 billion to
import full sets of equipments and other advanced
technology. 129 Though Tienanmen Square Massacre and the
following readjustment period will temporarily reduce the
amount of technology import, the emphasis on the key role of
foreign technology has not changed. 130
Despite all the thoughtful policies and rapid growth in
the past, China's technology importation was not without
problems. The most severe problem is the limitation of
China's ability to absorb foreign technology. As one author
had pointed out:
"The real issue is whether China will prove able to
absorb the foreign ideas and techniques essential to its
modernization without relapsing into xenophobia. ,,131
However, to say absorbing limitation is the problem is
perhaps too general, because this problem is the result of a
combination of many other problems. Some of them are
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fundamental and have hindered Chinese economy, some of them
are peculiar to importation of technology. Among them are,
first, inadequate infrastructure for absorbing and
disseminating technology rapidly. 132 As pointed out
earlier, China's infrastructure industries like energy,
transportation and communication are astonishingly
underdeveloped. This constitutes the biggest obstacle for
absorbing and disseminating newly acquired technology.
Secondly, a number of other factors which constitute the
"soft environment of investment,,133 have also hindered
foreign investment of capital and technology. For example,
the Chinese way of thinking and doing business is so
different from the outside world as to constitute an
unfavorable element in the eyes of foreign businessmen. The
Chinese have a tradition of insisting international
transactions be conducted according to their own terms.134
They will not make much efforts to accommodate the needs and
traditions of the foreign party, but would rather make the
foreign party to get used to the Chinese traditions, even if
it is the Chinese themselves who are trying to attract
foreign investment and technology. 135 The complicated
interpersonal relations and personal interests can be more
important than business and corruptions can sometimes take
priori ty over the business negotiation. 136 Thirdly, there
exist an inadequacy of qualified scientific, engineering and
technical personnel. Although in absolute terms China has a
pool of 22.18 million of scientists and technicians, this is
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far from adequate. 137 The lack of manpower is exacerbated
by the other problems. There is an unbalanced distribution
of talent by region and sector.1~ Too much talent is
crowded in centralized institutions and wasted, while
enterprises and other production facilities (especially
rural areas) where experts are most needed suffer a severe
shortage of engineers and technicians.
Moreover, the mobility of technical personnel is
limited. Institutes tends to regard technical personnel as
their own property139 and are reluctant to allow the
movement of engineers to the place where they are most
needed and also most qualify; (c) the education system
produces graduates who either lack hands-on experience or
are narrowly trained;14o (d) outflow of intellectuals into
Western countries. This is most evident after the Tien'anmen
Square Massacre.
Fourthly, there exist inadequate management skills,
poor training, discipline and problem-solving skills.
Managers are frequently concerned about their individual
interests and this makes "risk avoidance a rational
individual strategy". 141 The centrally planned economy142
provide minimum incentive to managers to do more than
meeting the immediate production targets. Lack of incentive
coupled with lack of expertise, bureaucracy, all leads to
poor management skills (including problem solving Skill).
The poor training and discipline of workers is also one
frequently mentioned disincentive to foreign enterprises
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operating in China, according to the US Department of
Commerce. 143
Fifthly, there is inadequate legal protection, and a
lack of uniform enforcement of laws. Although China has
enacted a number of laws and regulations since 1979,144
most of the laws are quite general. 145 Some people think
that China still lack a "basic legal structure that serves
as the foundation for commercial enterprises and
transactions".146 Even the law is in the books, it might
not be enforced uniformly, even under similar circumstances.
This created inconsistent administration by "bureaucrats who
have not prized legality highly in the past"; 147
Sixthly, there is a shortage of foreign exchange. 148
China has not been able to earn enough hard currency to pay
for its import. Because of the shortage, foreign currency
is tightly controlled by the State. China has also begun to
borrow from foreign countries and international
institutions. In 1989, it is predicted, China's foreign debt
totalled 33.443 billion yuan. 149 As a result of the
shortage, foreign currency becomes an important factor in
import decision-making. This means foreign currency usually
will first be allocated to those industries that promise to
earn foreign exchange quickly; 150 and
Seventhly, the bureaucracy is a fundamental problem
that exists in almost every area of Chinese economy. One
major content of the economic reform now going on is to
decentralize decision-making authority and reducing the role
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of the Party committee in economic management. 151 However,
enterprises after such reform have not always been able to
"escape the heavy hands of party cadres, who want to
maintain of old ways of doing things".152 The Tienanmen
Massacre provides a best example. In fact, the student
demonstration is a demand to reform the rigid, bureaucractic
political system which no longer accommodates the fast
economic growth brought by Western technology. However, the
demand was unsuccessful, the existing political system does,
and will seriously hinder China's technology import, at
least for a while.
The limitation of China's ability to absorb imported
technology can also attributed to a lot of other reasons
which may include historical reasons such as its poor
industrial base, withdrawal of soviet technical assistance
in the 50's, severe economic failure brought by the Great
Leap Forward, West trade embargo, economic dislocation
brought by the Cultural Revolution,153 as well as cultural
reasons 154 and pol itical reasons. 155
The success of China's drive to modernize its science
and technology by acquiring and adopting foreign technology
depends to a large degree on the correct resolution or
mitigation of these major problems. However, from a legal
standpoint only, foreign technology sellers are more
concerned about the degree of protection Chinese law could
provide to their intellectual property.
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C. CHINA'S TECHNOLOGY IMPORT - LEGAL FRAMEWORK
1. The "Technology Regulations", the "Technology Contract
Procedures" and the "Implementing Details"
On May 24, 1985, the State Council of China promulgated
China's first national regulation governing technology
transfer to Chinese enterprises outside of the SEZs: 156
Regulations on Administration of Technology Import Contracts
of the People's Republic of China (Technology
Regulations).157 Later the Procedures for the Examination
and Approval of Technology Import Contracts (hereinafter the
"Technology Contract Procedures") also became effective on
September 18, 1985. 158 However, the latter has been
supplanted by a new regulation on January 20, 1988: the
Implementing Details of the Regulations on Administration of
Technology Import Contracts of the People's Republic of
China (hereinafter the "Implementing Details"). 159
The Technology Regulations and the Implementing Details
are two legal documents directly governing the technology
transfer activities between China and a foreign party. 160
The Regulations contains only 13 articles. Article 3 of
the Regulations requires the imported technology to be
"advanced and appropriate,,161 in addition to meeting at
least one of the other eight requirements. Briefly, these
eight requirements demand that the technology promote
production (in terms of quantity and quality), exports,
domestic science and technology level, that it be conducive
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to safety, environmental protection, full use of local
resources, and improvement of business management. 162
Article 6 appears to be unique in that it requires the
licensor to guarantee that the licensor be the lawful owner
of the technology to be provided; that the concerned
technology must be "complete, without error, effective and
able to reach the objectives as provided for in the
Contract. ,,163In return for such guarantee, the Chinese
licensee agrees to keep the confidentiality of the
technology as required by the contract.1M
Another important article of the Regulations is Article
9, which prohibits the inclusion of any of the listed nine
restrictive clauses into the contract. These restrictive
clauses would, for example, restrict the quantity, variety
or sales price of the products the recipient produces using
the imported technology; restrict the recipient's export
markets or sales channels.1M
provisions similar to that set out in the Technology
Regulation can also be found in some other third world
legislation. However, the Chinese Regulations1~ are less
restrictive than equivalent laws in many developing countri-
es,167 although it left many important questions
unanswered. 168
The Implementing Details are more complete than the old
Technology Contract Procedures. 169 The maj or change the
new Implementing Details made is that more strict screening
and examining procedures are imposed.1ro Besides the
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original five kinds of technology contracts that are subject
to approval, a catch-all provision is added. 171 Moreovers,
new provisions are added to make some patent and trademark
related contracts or contracts that contain tax clauses
subject to patent law, trademark law or tax law
respectively,1n although the approving authority is still
MOFERT and its authorized agents.1~ Article 14 allows two
exceptions to Article 9 in the "Technology Regulations",
i.e., restrictive clause would be allowed in a contract
where the licensor had already made exclusive concession
contract or exclusive agency contract in a foreign country.-
1~ However, Article 18 further invalidates nine types of
contracts, which are not identical to the nine situations
prohibited in Article 9 of the "Technology Regulations".
For example, contracts that violate Chinese law and
sovereignty or public interests are not valid, nor are
contracts that do not guarantee the technical level of the
technology to be imported and the economic effect (including
quality and quantity of the product).1~ During the
contract period,1~ the property right to any improvement
made on the imported technology belongs to the licensee.1n
As to the price of the raw materials, and equipments
necessary for the imported technology, the Implementing
Details explicitly requires that it should not exceed the
international market price.1~ In a way similar to the
"Technology Regulations", the Implementing Details required
the licensor to guarantee that it is the lawful owner of the
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technology and the licensor is responsible for any
ownership disputes and liable for recipient's economic loss
incurred because of such disputes.1N Again, in return
for the licensor's such liability, the recipient should bear
the duty to keep the confidentiality of the technology, but
only within the contract period. Further, the recipient is
not liable for disclosure of the secrecy by reason not
attributable to the recipient.1~
Although the Implementing Details are more complete
than the former Technology Contract Procedures, they still
contain some vague spots. For example, what kinds of
provisions should be contained in order for a contract to be
complete?181 To what extent should licensor make a
"guarantee,,?182 For the time being, it can only be hoped
that future practice will shed more lights on the inter-
pretation of these vague points. until clear answers are
given, parties must rely more on their own contract
provisions.
2. Foreign Economic Contract Law
Before China's legal system is fully developed, the
contract proper had been and will be the major legal
document between the parties.1~ However, on March 21,
1985, the Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's
Republic of China was passed as one of the first Chinese
contract laws. (hereinafter as FECL)1M This 43-article
law specifically governs nearly all economic contracts
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between Chinese and foreign parties. 185 It contains the
following seven chapters: General Provisions; Formation of
Contract; Performance of Contract and Liabilities for
Breach; Assignment; MOdification, Recession and Termination:
Dispute Resolution; and "Supplementary Provisions".
As to contract formation, Article 7 requires that
foreign economic contracts must be in writing and
signed.1U It should not violate the law or public
interest of China. 187 Contracts concluded by means of
fraud or under duress are invalid1~ and the defaulting
party should pay the innocent party any loss incurred due to
such invalid contract.1~ Articles 12-15 specifically
list provisions the foreign economic contract should
contain, even though
most of these would be included as a matter of course in a
well-drafted business contract in the West. 190
One party may suspend performance if there is
"concrete" or "definite" evidence that the other party
cannot perform. 191 In case of nonperformance and breach,
the victim may ask for remedy or claim for damages. 192
Damages may be liquidated (which amount may be changed if it
"substantially" varies from the resultant loss). 193
However, breach causing damage is excused in case of "force
maj eure". 194
Article 29 permits unilateral cancellation of the
contract under four situations. 195 The contract may also
be terminated1% or modified. But a contract which had
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been subject to approval by administrative authority can not
be significantly modified without new approval by that
original authority. 197 However, in case of cancellation or
termination, the right to damages,1~ provisions for
settlement of disputes 199 and accounts200 in the
original contract remain effective even after the contract
has been cancelled or terminated. As to dispute settlement,
the Chinese still prefer consultations or mediation by a
third party as the first steps to settle disputes. If these
fail, the Chinese would prefer arbitration to
litigation. 201
Like many other Chinese laws, FECL is only a skeleton
which will require practice and other implementing rules to
provide the flesh.
3. Patent Law and Trademark Law
The Patent Law of the People's Republic of China
(hereinafter Patent Law) 202 "landmark legislation". 203
Prior to the passage of this patent law in 1984, a number of
regulations existed to encourage invention and technical
improvement. 204 However, because of the Marxism-Leninism
ideology that knowledge and technological invention should
be owned by all, no patent system really existed in China
prior to the enactment of the 1984 patent law.
The Patent Law was enacted to protect patent rights for
inventions-creations, to promote the development of science
and technology. 205 Another implied strong purpose or its
44
raison d'etre is to facilitate the importation of foreign
technology, because practices had suggested that many
foreign businessmen were reluctant to sell their technology
to China without assurance of patent protection from China.
The 69 articles of the law are covered under eight
chapters: General Provisions; Patent Criteria; Application,
Examination and Approval; Duration, Cessation and
Invalidation; Compulsory License; Infringement and
Protection; and "Supplementary Provisions". The
Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law was also
promulgated in January, 1985.2~
According to the Patent Law, a Chinese patent is
granted to "inventions-creations", which includes
inventions, utility models and designs,207 except when
they violate the law, social morality or public
interest. 208 However, the law distinguishes "service
invention-creation" ,209 in which case the right to apply
for patent belongs to the entity where the inventor works,
from "non-service invention/creation", where the inventor or
creator himself has the right to apply for patent. Article
9 established the "first-file" criterion in patent
application. 210 This means that in case of application
for patent for the identical invention/creation, the first
applicant (not the first inventor) will be granted the
patent.
An invention or utility model must possess novelty,
inventiveness and practical applicability in order to be
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patentable. 211 However, a design only needs to possess
novelty. 212 The requirements for patent application are
regulated in Articles 26-33. After all these requirements
are satisfied, the Patent Office will first conduct a
preliminary examination213 and then a substantive
examination to decide whether an invention meets the
criteria for patent.214 If the decision of the Patent
Office is positive and there is no opposition by a third
party, a patent will be granted, 215 which will last for 15
years.216 The patent right may be ceased217 or
invalidated218 under several situations. The Patent Law
also grants compulsory license where the original patentee
failed to exploit the patent in three years without
justified reason219 or where there is a need to use
earlier or later invention or utility model.22o
No one may exploit a Chinese patent without the consent
of the owner, 221 except when the inventions are of great
significance to the state or public interest and the
government comes in to designate their use. 222 Any
exploitation of the patent, without the authorization of the
patentee, constitutes an infringing act,223 except under
situations which are expressly regarded as non-infringement
by the law. 224 In case of an infringement dispute,
administrative authority for patent affairs may order an
injunction against infringing party. Any dissatisfied party
may also institute litigation in the People I s Court. 225
Infringement with serious effects such as divulging secret
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of the state may subject the infringers to criminal
prosecution. 226
The Chinese Patent Law treats foreign patent
application in substantially the same way as required by the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
("Paris Convention"), since China acceded to that convention
on November 14, 1986. The Paris Convention rule prevails
when it conflicts with the Chinese Patent Law provisions.
The Patent Law also recognizes priority rights of foreign
applicants if there is multilateral or bilateral patent
treaties or reciprocal treatment of patent arrangements
between China and the concerned foreign country. 227
Therefore, Chinese Patent Law is seen by some as "a blend of
Western property protection and socialist ideology", 228 or
even as a "basically Western" law.229
Unlike their attitudes toward patent right, the Chinese
were more readily to recognize trademark rights and the
benefits of a trademark system to the country as a whole.
The uniform use of trademark should help ensure that Chinese
consumers can get goods of consistent quality. Also, a
trademark system is "less offensive than other forms of
intellectual property to Chinese socialist ideologues, since
a trademark right most often belongs to an enterprise or
collective body and not to an individual".23o
In less than one year after the Communist take-over,
the PRC enacted the Provisional Regulations Governing the
Registration of Trademarks (1950) which was replaced by the
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1963 Regulations Governing the Control of Trademarks. On
August 23, 1982, China formally enacted the Trademark Law of
the People's Republic of China (hereinafter "Trademark
Law") ,231 which replaced both of the old regulations. The
Rules for Implementation of the Trademark Law of the
People's Republic of China was also promulgated on March 10,
1983 (hereinafter "Trademark RUles,,).232
The new Trademark Law is to protect the exclusive right
to use a trademark and to guarantee the quality of the goods
bearing that trademark.233 The emphasis on protecting the
quality of goods is further seen in Article 6 and Article
31, which provide that deceiving practices shall be stopped
and inferior quality of goods may lead to revocation of the
trademark. Another salient feature of the Trademark Law is
that trademark rights in China arise only as a result of
registration in China. A trademark applicant generally does
not have to show prior use. 234 The law also sets other
conditions and requirements for trademark application. For
example, certain words or designs cannot be used as
trademarks. 235 The application should not be identical or
similar to a trademark registered by a third party. 236
When identical or similar trademarks for the same or similar
goods are being applied, the first filed trademark will be
registered ("first file rule") .237 Also, trademark can be
assigned or licensed.238 It may be revoked as well under
certain circumstances such as ceasing use for three
consecuti ve years. 239
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The infringement of trademark not only includes the un-
authorized or unlicensed use of a trademark which is
identical or similar to the registered trademark of a third
person on the same or similar goods, but also includes the
unauthorized manufacturing or marketing of another person's
trademark symbol, or "otherwise injuring the right of
another person to exclusive use of a registered
trademark. ,,240The injured party may request the Industry
and Commerce Administration to initiate an action, which may
be an injunction or imposition of fine against the
infringer; or the injured party may go directly to the
People's Court. 241 Under the Trademark Law, it is also
possible to subjugate the "directly responsible" infringer
to criminal liability.242
Although the concept of trademark protection is still
new to the Chinese, the new Trademark Law clearly "evinces
China's increasing commitment to creating a favorable legal
environment for doing business" in China. 243 The
tremendous increase in the number of trademark applications
since 1982 suggests that the law will certainly have
positive effects on facilitating the flow of foreign
technology into China.
4. Other Related Law and Regulations
(a) civil Procedure Law
When a foreign party brings a suit in a Chinese court,
the civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China
(b) US-China Trade Agreement
On July 7, 1979, the Agreement on Trade Relations
Between the United States of America and the People's
Republic of China was signed. (hereinafter "Trade
Agreement") 252 This is an important document for US-China
trade since it grants Most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to
each other; 253 and provides reciprocal intellectual
property protection. 254 It also has important provisions
about free currency convertibility, 255 dispute
settlement,256 etc. It should be noted that prior to the
"Special Regulations of Civil Procedure Involving
Foreigners" .246 This section stipulates expressly that a
foreigner or stateless person who brings an action or
responds to an action in a People's Court shall have the
same procedural rights and obligations as a citizen of the
PRC; in the case of foreign enterprise or entity, that
foreign enterprise or entity shall enjoy the rights and bear
the obligations according to this law. 247 The principle of
reciprocity was also recognized. 248 In case the CPL
conflicts with international treaties to which China is a
party, the latter shall prevail.249 However, as a
practical note, all hearings should be conducted in
Chinese250 by entrusted Chinese lawyers. 251
{hereinafter CPL)2«
litigation conducted
observe this law". 245
becomes relevant, since "all civil
in the territory of the PRC must
The CPL has a section entitled
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enactments of Chinese Patent Law and Trademark Law, Article
VI of this Trade Agreement provided the major legal basis
for protecting American licensor's intellectual property
rights. This is still true today with regard to copyright
protection.
(c) Joint Venture Law
The Chinese Joint Venture Law of 1979257 provides
another important legal framework for the importation of
foreign technology. The particular provision in point is
Article 5, which provides that each party to the joint
venture may contribute not only cash or capital, but also
industrial property rights as its investment in the venture.
"A joint venture that possesses advanced technology by world
standards may apply for a reduction of or exemption from
income tax for the first two or three profit making
years. ,,258 Other tax reduction or exemption provisions may
also be found in the separate "Interim provisions of the
Ministry of Finance Concerning the Reduction of or Exemption
from Income Tax on Royalties for Proprietary
Technology" .259 These tax privileges are available to
foreign royalty recipients who provide certain technologies
such as technology used to develop China's farming,
forestry, fishery, etc. 260
In order to improve the investment environment and
facilitate the importation of foreign technology, China
further promulgated the provisions of the state Council of
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the People's Republic of China for the Encouragement of
Foreign Investment (hereinafter "22 Provisions") 261 on
October 11, 1986. This "22 provisions" is aimed at granting
special preferences specifically to two kinds of enterprises
with foreign investments: "export enterprises" and
"technologically advanced enterprises". 262 These enterpr-
ises enjoy preferential treatments with regard to paYment of
subsidies, site use fees, use of water, electricity and
other infrastructure, receivment of loans, remittance of
profit abroad, export license, more independent
management2~ and a number of other tax and administrative
preferences.
In April, 1988, nine years after China first enacted
its law on equity joint ventures (EJVs), China adopted a law
on cooperative ventures (cooperative joint ventures or
CVs).2M This CVs law allows foreign investors more
benefits not available under the 1979 EJVs. For example,
under CVs law, foreigner may serve as chairman of the board
of directors of the CVi there is no specified time limit for
the term of a CV, comparing a 50-year limit on an EJVi it
also allows the contracting parties to determine the
distribution of earnings or products of the venture as they
choose, rather than in proportion to specified ownership
shares as required under EJV law.
On April 4, 1990, an amendment to the 1979 JV Law was
passed, in an effort to create a more attracting environment
for foreign investment.265 The major changes to the 1979
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JV law include: it explicitly stipulates China shall not
nationalize JVs unless the public interest requires; the
board of election or the parties after consultation may
elect their chairman, with no requirement that the chairman
be a Chinese; there is no limit on the term of the JV;
different lines of business will be handled differently in
this regard; the parties themselves may stipulate the term
of JV and they can apply for extension six months before
their agreed expiration date;
The joint venture does not have to open an account with
the Bank of China or its approved bank. Instead, it may open
a foreign exchange account with a bank or any other
financial institution which is permitted by the state agency
for foreign exchange control to handle foreign exchange
transactions.
In addition to the above law and regulations, there is
also a US-China Agreement on Cooperation in Science and
Technology and a number of other science and technology
protocols and memoranda signed under this umbrella
agreement.2~ These documents cover various specific
science and technology areas and they constitute important
legal instruments in technology transfer of those respective
areas.
5 ..Protection of Intellectual Property
The strength of the legal framework for China's
technology import can be tested on one legal issue: the
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protection of intellectual property. Due to the dominance
of Marxism ideology in the past, the concept of intellectual
property is relatively new to the Chinese. Not surprisingly,
there have been unauthorized use of foreign technology.
Among the notorious examples are the copy of German Leica
camera and Swedish Hasselblad camera, their Chinese versions
are named East Wing and Red Flag respectively. 267 The
Boeing 707 engine was also cloned in China by using spare
engines.2~ However, unsuccessful copy can also be found
when the Chinese tried to copy a urea fertilizer plant being
built in China by an American firm.2~ Such a failure to
copy may well give evidence to the conclusion that copying
today's standardized and mass-produced products is neither
very easy nor always effective, due to the lack of a modern
technology base in China (in terms of material and skilled
manpower). Based on this conclusion, theoretically, there
should be little need to concern about the protection of in-
dustrial property rights by foreign licensors. 270 However,
in reality, the concern is always there, even though it
could be mitigated partly by negotiating contractual
protection. 271
with regard to copyright protection, the picture is
even less encouraging. According to a Swedish study on
Chinese publishing in electronics and metallurgy, 20% of the
books on semi-conductor technology and computer technology
are translations of foreign books. In metallurgy, some 30-
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40% of the books on ovens, converters, non-ferrous
metallurgy are translations.2n
As China became exceedingly painful in need for foreign
technology, while foreign sellers were either reluctant to
sell or pressing for exorbitant price before they were
assured of legal protection of their intellectual property,
the Chinese authority gradually recognized the long-term
benefit of having patent and trademark systems for the
following reasons: first, copying of foreign technology
could only serve the immediate interest, if the copy is
successful at all. Yet, China will risk of losing long-term
benefit of foreign technology by such short-sighted copying
and reverse engineering; second, external pressure also
made Chinese government to realize that a patent system is
necessary if China wants to introduce foreign technology to
China and trade with foreign countries;2~ third, the
lack of a patent system may also hurt Chinese themselves
since it had caused the loss of some Chinese technology to
foreign businessmen2~ and hindered the domestic
technology invention; fourth, the success of Japanese by
adopting foreign technology in the 50's might have
encouraged the Chinese government to establish a legal
system that protects foreign intellectual property.
Besides enacting trademark law, patent law and a number
of.other domestic regulations, China also acceded to the
Paris Convention and joined the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) and became active internationally.
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since the passage of the Patent Law, China received
large number of patent application each year. In 1987,
26,077 patent applications were filed, 6811 were granted
patents.2~ The number of foreign applicants can be seen
from the 1986 statistics, which was 11,000 out of a total
24,000 applications, i.e., about 45%.2~
All these indicate that a technology-seeking China is
committing itself to establishing a legal framework that
protects foreign intellectual property (albeit there is
still much to be improved) in order to get foreign
technology it wants for its modernization drive. However,
the us has showed dissatisfaction with China's inadequate
intellectual property protection. In May 1989, the us Trade
Representative (USTR) and Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) reached an Memorandum
of Understanding expanding protection of intellectual
property rights in China.
Under this Memorandum of Understanding, China has to
make commitments to strengthen legal protection of foreign
intellectual property rights in China, in order to exchange
USTR's promise not to impose sanctions under section 301 of
the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act against China
"at this time.,,2n In copyright area, the Mimorandum of
Understanding stipulates that China will submit the draft
copyright law to the national People's Congress (NPC) by the
end of 1989, but no deadline for enactment by NPC is fixed.
Specially, it says that China's copyright law will include
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computer programs as a specific category to consider. The
MOU also stipulates that an amendment to China's patent law
be submitted to the state Council for examination by the end
of 1989 in order to expand the scope of patent protection.
However, perhaps due to the interruption of Tienanmen Square
Massacre and the resulting tension between US and China,
neither of the above deadlines seem to have been met.
Besides the Memorandum of Understanding, in January
1989, the 1979 bilateral Science and Technology agreement
was also let lapsed without new extension. As a further show
of dissatisfaction, USTR has put China on a "priority watch
list", next to being identified as a priority country for
sanction under Section 301.
The Memorandum of Understanding showed that the U.S.
Government was reluctant to take any radical move against
China. This general reluctance is again demonstrated by the
actions taken by the Bush administration after the Tiananmen
Massacre. One year after the massacre, Bush advocated
extending MFN trade status to China, despite the criticism
that his tolerance is such that he was actually "kowtowing"
to Chinese government.
As if to show its commitment to provide protection to
foreign investors, in September 1990, China enacted its
first copyright law (effective June 1, 1991). This law
basically satisfies the requirement of the MOU, because it
specifically protects computer software. However, it is too
early to tell the effect of this new law.
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In any event, China's current legal framework for
intellectual property protection will continue to be tested,
changed and improved in the future by foreign demands for
more protection, and by China's needs for foreign
technology.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
Even today, China is still a mystery to many foreign
businessmen. It remained virtually closed to the outside
world in most of its history. Yet it once developed into a
prosperous and strong feudal power. However, Industrial
Revolution led the Western countries far ahead of China
technologically. As a result of competition for the world
market, a technologically backward China fell prey to
Western powers easily after the 1840 Opium War. Since then
China's door was forced open and the Chinese had experienced
a "century of humiliation", which caused their xenophobia
and their ambivalence toward Western technology. The
People's Republic of China under the Communists has
constantly struggled for independence and adherence to the
principle of national sovereignty. However, because People
Republic of China had virtually no industrial base at the
time of its establishment, it could only rely on the Soviet
assistance in the 1950's. But the Soviet struck a heavy
blow to the Chinese who were trying to build a strong
socialist China by suddenly withdrawing all its technical
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assistance to China. As a result, China reverted to the
extreme policy of self-reliance. Such extreme self-reliance
had been detrimental to China partially during the Great
Leap Forward and later during the Cultural Revolution.
Although China started to seek Western technology since the
early 1970's in order to realize its Four MOdernization, the
effect of imported Western technologies in the 70's remained
minimum since only whole-plants, instead of pure technology
and know-how, were imported.
Things have changed dramatically since the Open Door
policy. The Chinese gradually adopted a more pragmatic
technology import policy after numerous experiments and
mistakes. Such a policy seeks to import technology that
China needs most (such as technologies for China's
infrastructure industries) and that will fit in China.
Internationally, China continues to diversify the source of
technology supply; domestically, China has made every effort
to attract foreign technology by such means as joint
venture. At the same time, China is trying to set up a legal
framework that will better protect intellectual property and
thus facilitate the import of Western technology. After over
a decade of open door policy and economic reform, there has
already been evidence of the general success of the current
Chinese policy (albeit problems remain). The Tienanmen
Square Massacre brought some setback. However, the setback
will only be temporary. Even though political struggle
inside China is yet to be settled, the economic trend toward
openness will not, or is impossible to be changed;
therefore, the envision of modernizing China's economy by
importing foreign advanced technology remains very
optimistic.
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note 33, at 109. For the text of some of them, see suora
note 252, at 3. However, the 1979 Science and Technology
Agreement which offered China important opportunities for
acquiring new technologies, was allowed to lapse in January,
1989, in part as a result of US dissatisfaction with the
pace of improvement in China's intellectual property
protection system. Potter, Prosoects for Imoroved Protection
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CHAPTER II
US TECHNOLOGY EXPORT TO CHINA AND ITS CONTROL
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will first discuss United States exports
control generally. It will then discuss uinted States
technology policy toward China, tracing from the embargo on
trade with China in the 50's, to the gradual relaxation and
liberalization of the control, untill the current US
technology policy before the Tienanmen Square Massacre,
which places China in Country Group V as a friendly, non-
allied country, together with Western Europe and other
friendly countries. The effect of Tienanmen Square Massacre
on US technology export to China will be examined briefly.
Next, this chapter will look at the US legal framework
governing export control, focusing on the Export
Administration Act (EAA) and the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR) and its provisions related to China.
Before analyzing the changes made by the Export
Administration Amendment Act of 1985, the control of
commodities as opposed to the control of technical data will
be briefly discussed. The EAA 1979 will also be discussed
in order to provide a preview of the operations of the U.S.
export control. This includes the introduction of the
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concepts of export, the export license and foreign
availability.
While discussing EAR provisions related to China,
comparisons are made between China and other Group V
countries in order to show that differences still exist
between China and other Group V countries.
CoCom, an organization born after the World War II,
acted as a coordinator in the West's export control against
the Soviet Bloc. Today, despite the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the Warsaw Pact, CoCom still remains. While its fate
is unknown at present time, the role it played in the past
certainly deserves a part of this chapter.
A. EXPORT CONTROLS IN GENERAL
The use of export controls as a weapon against the
Socialist countries began immediately after the Second World
War.' By regulating exports to the Soviet bloc in the Cold
War era following the World War II, trade became an official
means to be used for political purposes. The major purpose
of such export control was to deny potential adversaries
access to Western strategic goods, particularly and mainly
strategic technology.2 It was also to keep the U.S.
military posture emerged at the end of the World War II and
to protect U.S. national security. However, export control
was perhaps first seen more as an instrument of economic
warfare against the Communist countries than as one to
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protect US national security, because the whole export
control was based on the economic theory that trade frees
Communist resources to be spent on military goods, thus
increasing their overall military strength.3
Generally, the united states export controls have three
objectives, i.e., they are imposed for the reasons of
national security, foreign policy and short supply. The
national security purpose is quite obvious: to prevent us
goods and technologies with military applications from
falling into the hands of unfriendly powers and thus
adversely affecting us national security.4 Export controls
have also been used frequently to implement certain u.s.
foreign policy objectives and to fulfill its international
obligations. 5 However, the third purpose, the prevention
of the exportation of goods whose export would lead to
shortages or increased inflation in the US,6 is rarely
used to curtail export of goods that are in domestic
scarcity. 7
It should be noted that sometimes export controls are
imposed for more than one of the above reasons. Besides,
export control is always a balance of two conflicting
interests.8 On the one side, there is the need for greater
business opportunities and open exchanges of ideas among
scientists. People on one side are mainly u.s. businessmen
and scientists. Businessmen argue that legitimate trade was
stifled by unreasonable delays in obtaining export licenses;
that in case of failure to obtain such a license after a
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contract had been signed, us companies often would have to
cancel the contract and this gained them a reputation for
being unreliable suppliers; that since us is usually not the
sole supplier for technology, the unilateral control on
exports by US would only boost the sales of foreign
competitors and cause loss to American companies.9
Scientists on this side argue that the technology
superiority of this nation depends on the open exchange
among scientists. 10 Besides, "the US technological lead is
no longer so great that we can afford to isolate ourselves
from mutually advantageous, cooperative exchanges with
foreign competitors. ,,11 On the other side of the conflict
are those who are worried about the leakage of scientific
data and sophisticated technology into the hands of
unfriendly countries that would endanger the US national
security. 12 This group is represented by the Department of
Defense (000) as opposed to the Department of Commerce which
represents the industrialists and which is also the major
agency charged with the administration of the Export Control
Act.
Because of the different goals and interest groups
these two departments represent, there have long been
friction and differences between them. "while the 000 raises
concerns about risks of having US technology freely
available on the world market, the Commerce Department
points out the adverse economic consequences of denying to
US technology free access to the world market". 13 However,
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Act of 1949 (hereinafter ECA 1949) was the first law
agencies agree that there should be some control on US
Not until June
the conflicts are not fatal and unresolvable, since both
technology. They only differ as to what extent and scope the
other agencies under the interagency review mechanism set up
by the Export Administration Act. 14
The Export Administration Amendment Act of 1985
technology should be controlled. In fact, theoretically,
they are supposed to cooperate with each other and with
act had gone through several generations. The Export Control
(hereinafter "EAAA 1985") is the current act governing
export control. Before EAAA 1985, the export administration
governing US export control for all purposes (national
security, foreign policy and short supply). 15 This was
it posed to national security at the same time, conflict
technology export to the US economy and the greater danger
replaced by the Export Administration Act of 1969
(hereinafter EAA 1969).16 Ten years later, EAA 1969 was
September 30, 1983. Because the increasing importance of
between the need to promote trade and the need to protect
national security became even more acute, which led to one
further replaced by the Export Administration Act of 1979
(hereinafter EAA 1979) .17 However, the EAA 1979 expired on
of the major legislative battles in the 99th Congress
regarding the amendment of the EAA 1979.18
27, 1985 was the expired EAA 1979 reauthorized in amended
form by the 99th Congress as the current EAAA 1985.19
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B. UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGY POLICY TOWARD CHINA
1. Embargo of Trade with China, 1949-1972
The ECA 1949 was passed even before the establishment
of the PRC.20 Selective trade controls were imposed by
the Commerce Department to prevent the export of strategic
goods to parts of China then controlled by the
Communists.21 A list of goods requiring a validated
license22 for export to China was developed soon after the
Communist took over the mainland China.23 By March 1950,
the level of US controls of exports to China were already
equivalent to the control level US imposed on Soviet and the
Eastern Europe,24 which means virtually all American
exports to China were embargoed.25
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 further
tightened the control.26 America's immediate reaction to
the War were the effective seizure of Chinese assets in the
United States and a total embargo of American exports to
PRC27 by stopping issuing and revoking all outstanding
validated licenses for exports to PRC. The Department of
Transportation also promulgated Transportation Orders T-1
and T-2 to prohibit the transport or loading of any cargo
destined for the PRC by a United States flag air or sea
carrier.28 The PRC retaliated by seizing all United States
property in China by a decree of December 29, 1950.29 In
response, the united States denied Most Favored Nation (MFN)
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treatment to PRC imports and also banned the united states
Export-Import Bank financing of us trade with China.3D
Thus, by the end of 1950, there was greater level of
control on trade with China as compared to trade with other
Communist nations.31 Although with the end of the Korean
War and death of stalin, America, especially its allies,
relaxed their trade restrictions to the Soviet and Eastern
Europe, total embargo on trade with China continued. This
gap between the level of us control on trade with China and
the level of Control on trade with the Soviet bloc was what
became known as the "China Differential ,,32 In the late
50's, this differential was gradually abandoned (though
restrictions were still maintained) by America's allies in
the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(CoCom).33 After the official abolishment in 1959 of the
CHINCOM list - a controlled item list of the CoCom's China
Committee (CHINCOM) which imposed more extensive
restrictions on trade with China than on trade with other
Communist countries - the European members of CoCom as well
as Japan formally eliminated the "China Differential" by
applying the same restrictions to both China and the Soviet
Union. Those countries believe that it would be to their
own interests to adopt a more even-handed approach to trade
with China vis-a-vis other Communist countries,34 because
Western Europe and Japan had been historically more
dependent on foreign trade for their economic growth than
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the United states, which has a huge domestic market and was
able to be relatively self-dependent.35
Despite the relaxation by its CoCom partners at that
time, the United states stubbornly maintained a total
embargo on trade with China, in addition to highly
restricting exports to the Soviet bloc. Thus, by 1968, the
United states had become the only country still actively
engaged in economic warfare against the Communist nations.
It unilaterally restricted exports of 1,100 items which were
freely available to the Communist countries from other CoCom
nations and other sources. 36 Thus, the "China
Differential" was still in place within the us when
President Nixon came to office37 and served as a ground
for us export control policy toward China.
2. Current US Technology Policy Toward China and Its
Evolvement
The unilateral trade embargo against the Communist
nations had placed burden on the United states business in
their attempt to capture a significant part of the Communist
markets. 38 The American businesses were unable to compete
with European or Japanese companies within Communist markets
since they encountered more export control obstacles. On
the other hand, the Japanese and European economies had
fully recovered economically from World War II. As they
became less dependent on the US, they saw a greater need to
export to the Communist world.39 These countries also
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demand US to relax multilateral control within CoCom. In
response to internal and external pressures to liberalize
East-West trade, the EAA 1969 was passed by Congress to
substitute the ECA 1949. The EAA 1969 explicitly declared
that "it is the policy of the United states ..• to encourage
trade with all countries with which we have diplomatic or
trading relations."~
At the same time, the Nixon administration began to
relax tense relations with China in general and embargo in
particular. First, tourists were allowed to go to China and
they could bring home up to $100 worth of Chinese goods so
long as the goods were not intended for sale or commercial
use.41 On December 22, 1969, an order became effective
which include such important steps as: general license can
be issued to importation of non-commercial goods of Chinese
origin; American carriers may transport goods of Chinese
origin merchandise from one foreign country to another and
such shipments can be insured by American insurance com-
panies; most importantly, American controlled companies and
banks abroad may engage in trade and financial transactions
with PRC.42 Although a number of restrictions still
remained,43 detente was the mainstream, which finally led
to Nixon's surprising visit to China in 1972 and the
following declaration of the Shanghai Communique. Both sides
of the Communique "viewed bilateral trade as another area
from which mutual benefits could be derived, and agreed that
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economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit were
in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. ,,44
Another major change in US-China relation came when the
two countries normalized their diplomatic relation on
January 1, 1979.45 In trade area, the Agreement on Trade
Relations Between the united States of America and the
People's Republic of China (hereinafter "Trade agreement")
was signed on January 7, 1979.46 In this document, the
United States formally extended MFN to China.47 The
Agreement also set down provisions that would facilitate us-
China trade such as establishment of trade offices,48
bilateral protection of intellectual property,49 etc.
After the establishment of diplomatic, political and
cultural ties between the two countries, the United states
control on exports to China had seen more dramatic
relaxation, as was evidenced by changing China into
different country groups. The Country Group is a system of
dividing the nations of the world into different groups for
the purpose of export control. Different country groups are
subject to different levels of control levels.50
Initially, China was placed in Group Z (the most restrictive
Group), together with Cuba, North Korea and North
Vietnam. 51 At the end of the embargo in 1971, China was
moved to Country Group Y, together with the Warsaw Pact
countries. As the control of exports to China was further
relaxed after the normalization of relation, on April 25,
1980, China was escalated to an independent category, Group
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P, which included only China.52 However, such a change is
"little more than a status symbol", since the licensing
procedures for exports remain the same as when China was in
Group y.53 However, in January 1980, shortly after the
soviet invasion of Afghanistan and on the eve of Defense
Secretary Harold Brown's trip to Beijing, President Carter
made an important decision to sell China military useful
equipment - though not weapons. By this decision, the sale
of dual-use (can be used for both military and civilian
purposes) technology and equipment to China would be
considered on a case-by-case basis.~
The Reagan Administration continued the policy of
liberalizing export control with China. In June 1981,
President Reagan issued a directive governing technology
transfer to China which stated that the United states
"supports a secure, friendly and modernized China" and
allowed for approval of equipment and technology at
technical levels twice that approved for the USSR (the
Soviet level prior to their invasion of Afghanistan).55
This "two times" policy had not only caused difficulty in
its implementation, but the comparison of China with USSR
had also offended the Chinese government.56 Nonetheless,
it constituted a new "China Differential" - this time
tilting favorably toward China, allowing China greater
access to high technology items than any other Communist
countries. 57 However, compared to what the US allows
to be licensed to the free world, the "two times" policy was
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"demonstrably more restrictive." The intent of the
President to increase technology transfer to China was not
being fully implemented.58 Therefore, in May 1983,
President Regan decided to place China in Group V - in the
same category as certain other friendly countries (such as
Western Europe and non-Communist countries in Asia).59
This final decision clearly reflected the US official
technology export policy toward China after 1981, which was
stated by the Department of state:
"Our export controls for China should reflect its role
as a friendly, non-adversary state, clearly differentiating
China from the Soviet bloc and minimizing the regulatory
burden on us companies. We want to help us companies employ
their technology edge fully and gain greater opportunities
in the China market. Participating in China's economic
development benefits business and strengthens bilateral
ties. We want to have China look to us as a trusted
supplier. ,,60
Pursuant to this decision, on November 23,1983, the
Office of Export Administration (OEA) of the DOC published
an amendment to the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR)61 New technical guidelines have been and will
continue to be developed in order to streamline the
licensing procedure.62 Unfortunately, however, most of
the changes made in the 1983 amendment to EAR "are cosmetic
to reflect the PRC' s change to Country Group V status". 63
The Chinese had been dissatisfactory about the us technology
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control with China. The US technology policy was denounced
by several Chinese officials, including Deng Xiao-Ping, as
"capricious", and that the US technology transfer system was
seen as "inconsistent and incomprehensible".64
As the Chinese were demanding more, and the two
countries were improving their relations, the US technology
control with China was further relaxed to a degree that the
two countries had even begun military cooperation (albeit
limited), including rapidly expanding sales of dual-use
technology and increasingly frequent military visits and
infrequent military sales.65
Although the major trend is toward loosening the
control, it has not proceeded smoothly all the time. A
recent incident involved the Chinese sale of Silkworm
missiles to Iran that could be capable of sinking oil
tankers. In order to stop China from further sales, the
united States increased pressure on China by suspending a
proposed expansion of technology sales to China,M and by
halting an interdepartment review of computers, electronic
equipment and other high-technology items that were to be
released for export to China.67 After the Chinese missile
sales to Iran was no longer reported, the Reagan
administration officials said that an "internal study will
be resumed with an eye toward expanding the list of items
tnat can be exported.,,68
Despite the continuous loosening of the technology
control, the new "China Differential" may not continue to be
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widened. Conversely, it might even be reduced or eliminated
due to the detente developed between the united states and
the soviet recently and the tensions between the us and
China after the Tienanman Square Massacre. Series of recent
events~ suggest that there may be more economic and
technological cooperation between the united states and the
USSR in the future. Such a prediction is further warranted
considering that evenhandedness and strategic balance remain
the long term united States policy toward all Communist
countries. As one author correctly pointed out:
"•.• as long as the atmosphere of detente between the
United States and the Soviet prevailed, even-handedness
toward Communist nations continued to be the official US
trade position."ro
Secretary Baldrige also assured the congressmen at a
Congress hearing that despite the new US technology transfer
policies toward China, such transfer· "will not alter the US-
PRC strategic balance, though the transfer of technology
will prevent a widening of military gap between the PRC and
the USSR. ,,71
The differential between China and Soviet has its
limits. As a matter of fact, the reason for creating
"differential" is for the purpose of achieving the strategic
balance. Again, quoting Secretary Baldrige's testimony:
"We will not allow our commitment to assist the Chinese
modernization effort to override US national security
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interests or the enforcement of the Export Administration
Act. ,,72
China is viewed by the official us policy as a
"friendly but not an allied country" - an important one
because it could be a counterpart to the Soviet.~
Therefore, the US technology transfer to China, while
beneficial to China, undoubtedly comes after America's own
interests - not only strategic interest but also commercial
and political interests.
To the United states, "an America deepening its
relations with China does so not only out of genuine
sentiment, and not only out of natural curiosity, it does so
out of the same combination of principle and self-interest
that is the engine of mature relations among all modern
states."~ The technology transfer and exports to the
China market may not only help the American balance of trade
deficit, it may also act as a spur to innovation and
productivity in American industry as new customers are
developed.~ The efforts to help China's modernization by
exporting technology to China is also consistent with the
American global foreign policy because it may help make
China an integral part of the international market ~ and
make China an important stable element that will contribute
to world peace. Therefore, "strengthening China, making it
a more competent international actor is clearly in the
interests of the United states and ..• facilitating transfers
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of technology bringing that about are to be highly
recommended. "n
Despite the enormous and apparent benefits which the
technology export to China will bring to the United states
(as well as to China and the world as a whole), there are
some disputes about whether the United States should relax
its restrictions on export, especially the export of weapon
and dual-use technology, to China.
Those in favor of restricting sales of weapons and
dual-use technology to China argue that
1) military technology exported to China could be used
by China to adversely affect the United states' interests in
the far east area, such as potential conflict areas of
Taiwan, Korea, etc;n
2) on the other hand, military or dual-use technology
sale to China may arouse the apprehensions of China's
smaller neighbors and even cause anxiety in Japan. Of
course, the greatest fear of the opponents of liberalizing
export control to China is the concern that dual-use
technology exported today could be used against the united
states tomorrow. The history of liberal technology sales to
the Soviet in the detente period of 70's also serves as a
remainder that caution should always be exercised in selling
technology to potentially hostile country, because many may
feel that Western exports to the Soviet in the 70's merely
supported a military buildup to the detriment of the United
states and its allies;~
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3) selling technology to China may not reduce the
military gap between China and the Soviet as perceived. To
the contrary, "increases in sales of high technology to the
Chinese may only result in a more vigorous Soviet drive to
counterbalance the perceived danger by increasing its own
defenses or by making relations between the superpowers even
more tense", because the Soviet does fear the emergence of
a militarily strong China and a more active anti-soviet
coalition. This would very well weaken rather than
strengthen the security of China and other East Asian
countries;OO
4) there is also concern in the United States that"
selling technology to China will help create a new economic
rival just like Japan, as well as a military superpower. 81
However, people in favor of liberalizing technology control
with China see not only the great benefits the
liberalization will bring to both sides,82 they also view
US-China relation as a different one from the US-Soviet
relation. Since China is relatively weak economically,
technologically and militarily, and because China's limited
ability to absorb foreign technology,83 there is less
danger that China will divert imported technology to
military use that could threaten the United States
interests. Besides, applying identical restriction to China
and the Soviet would impose a de fact discrimination against
China considering China's military and economic weakness.M
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Secondly, if the united states does not sell technology
to China, the Japanese, French and other European countries
will do,85 since the united states is no longer a single
suppliers of technology (with very few exceptions).
Thirdly, China's economic growth is much more dependent
on internal Chinese factors than on U.S. actions, thus U.s.
ability to influence China is limited; therefore, as one
expert noted:
"The choice facing American, however, is not whether we
prefer a powerful China to a weak China unable to threaten
its neighbors, China, if it continues on its present
course,~ is going to be a world superpower whether U.s.
contributes to the process or not •...••~
From these opposing views the united states
Administration has rationally come out with an overall
technology policy toward China which rests on broad
consensus: the United states supports the transfer of
technology to China, but within certain limits set by
national security considerations. The simple reason or
fundamental rationale behind this policy again is that
assisting China in its modernization will serve U.S.
interests. M The parameters around this policy, such as
the nature of the technology, its intended use, the Chinese
as recipient, the potential danger to U.s. national
security, the political climate and economic situation in
both countries (majorly in China), etc. will certainly
influence the emphasis89 and scope of this pOlicy.
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However, it is predictable that as long as China remains
committed to its economic modernization and remains
relatively stable politically, the United states will also
keep its commitment to helping China's drive for
modernization. On the other hand, U.S. economic and
technological help may promote China's current policy by
playing a stabilizing and encouraging role.9o
During the past decade, technology transfer has
remained "one of the strongest threads in U.S.-China
bilateral relations, and it is the one that holds the key to
achieving the full potential of this extremely dynamic
relationship. ,,91 The current U.S. export policy had
significant and will have even more significant contribution
to the interests of both countries. As Ambassador Chris
Phillips put it, the new U.S. export policy "has had a more
positive impact on our relations than anything that has
happened since normalization (of the relations) in 1979. ,,92
The US technology export to China has also seen tremendous
growth. From 1982 through 1986, about 3.5 billion in high
technology equipment was sold to China.~ However, this is
just a tiny portion of the full potential of US - China
technology trade. There is more room for growth than what
has already been achieved, because in 1985, US counted only
10% of China's import and 12% of China's export.~
The U.S. government could also do more to assist US
firms exporting technology and equipments to China. In the
past few years, the government had provided only limited
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loans and other trade financing services to China,95 even
though such financing is critical to the US firms' ability
to win a contract in China. Although there are a number of
governmental programs that help promote technology to
China,% so far the US provides no official development
assistance (ODA) to China, while Japanese provide 52% of all
ODA received by China. 97
The United states technology policy toward China proper
is not without problems. In fact, the Chinese have been
dissatisfied with the American control of technology flow to
China. First, because many of the new changes are
cosmetic~ and sYmbolic, the old restrictions have
remained in essence; secondly, in areas where technology is
most needed by China, the us regulations are most
restrictive and also most difficult to change;W thirdly,
the export license and multilateral control through CoCom
had caused serious delay or cancellation in transferring
technology to China; During his visit to the White House,
former Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xue-Qian complained of
inadequate development of trade, scientific and
technological relations between the United states and China.
He hoped that the us business and industry will "take a long
view. ,,100
3. After Tienanmen Square Massacre
The blood crush of Chinese student demonstrators at
Tienanmen Square in 1989 by the Chinese government shocked
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the united states. The US-China relation became intense as
the Chinese blamed involvement by the US government,
accusing the attempt by US to help overturn the Chinese
Communist. This tragic event brought a sudden freeze to the
friendly course of the US-China relationship. The damages
caused to the Sino-US relations, according to former
President Nixon, was "very great", "the most serious" since
1972, when Nixon himself stated the US-China
relationship. 101
The Bush Administration's immediate reaction was to
suspend government and commercial arms sales to China, to
halt contacting with the Chinese military, but diplomatic
and commercial ties were left open. 102 Meanwhile, high-
level government exchanges were stopped, new loans to China
were postponed. The European community also called for a
freeze on arms sales and on new export credits and World
Bank Loans to China. 103
Specifically, the suspension of military sales to China
banned all items controlled by the State Department and
cited on State's Munitions Control List (MCL). As a result
of the ban, about $600 million in foreign Military Sales
(FMS), i.e., government-to-government contracts - and about
$425 million worth of MCL commercial sales were suspended.
The State Department's Office of Munitions Control suspended
"all licenses and approvals", including manufacturing
licenses and technical assistance agreements. This affects
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all licenses already granted since June 1987 and those
pending review at the time of suspension.1~
The US reactions were based on political grounds, i.e.,
the ideal of protecting political democracy and human
rights. However, Henry Kissinger, cautioned the Bush
Administration on his eve to visit China in November 1989,
that u.s. relations with China should be determined by
strategic interests rather than us political
convictions. 105 The "strategic interests" he talks about
is the long-adhered us official policy in dealing with
Russia and China; i.e., to use China as a counterbalance
force against the Soviet.
Regardless whether Bush was reminded of by Kissinger or
was dictated by the us business interests in China, Bush's
policy has been one of tolerance, and to impose as few
sanctions as possible against China. His rationale is that
more sanctions will hurt "the Chinese people." Even the ban
of military sales was not absolute. For example, the loan
did not include dual-purpose high technology controlled by
DOC and contained on the Commodity Control List (CCL).
Waivers may also be granted to the ban in order to minimize
the suspension's impact on commercial sales. By mid-August
of 1989, Boeing had already received a waiver so that it can
deliver four 757s to China.1~
Several years has passed. More sanctions have been
lifted. Frozen loans have been granted. President Bush has
consistently tried to amend the u.s. relations with China
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lest it further deteriorates. In December 1989, Bush
approved sale of three satellites to China, waived Export-
Import Bank financing restrictions.107 The following
February, the US Export-Import Bank approved a $23.1 million
in financing to China.10B In June 1990, Bush further
extended MFN trade status to China before its expiration.
Given China's continuing needs for American technology,
given the continuing US strategic interests both military
and commercial in China, based on various events in the past
year, it is very safe to predict that the tension between
China and US will ease gradually and all the sanctions will
be lifted step by step, absent further political chaos
inside China. Even China reverses to a political cage as
dark as the Cultural Revolution, in the long run, China will
be forced to trade with the West, just as history had
already proved 18 years ago. Therefore, the Tienanmen Square
Massacre, though greatly damaged the Sino-US relations
relentlessly nourished by the people on both sides in the
past decade or more, will affect only temporarily the US-
China trade, if looking from a long-term view. China will
continue to need American technology, the US will not give
up its interest in China; both need each other.
In summary, the United States technology policy towards
China has evolved from total embargo of trade with China to
a more relaxed pOlicy which supports technology transfer to
China. As the two countries are improving their relations,
both sides have been able to see the mutual benefits that
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trade and technology transfer can bringing in, although
within the US debates still persist as to what extent
technology sales to China should be controlled due to
national security considerations. The current US policy is a
flexible and compromising one, which supports technology
sale to China limited by the national security
considerations. This policy has enormously increased the US
technology sale to China. However, such sale is still
lagging far below its full potential, mainly due to the
delay caused by the lengthy export license review and the
fact that many old restrictions remain in spite of the
escalation of China to Country Group V. The US trade
sanctions as a result of Tienanmen Square will only remain
temporarily, because in the long-run China will continue to
need American technology, and the US will not give up its
interests in China.
C. US Control of Technology Transfer to China - Legal
Framework
1. Control of Commodities and Control of Technical Date
The term of "export control" includes control not only
over US-origin commodities, but over US-origin technical
data as well.109 In other words, commodities are
technology in its hidden or embedded form, or the "hardware
bundled" technology, while technical data is technology in
its pure form, or "pure technology" 110 of any kind that
104
can be used, or adapted for use, in the design, production,
manufacture, utilization, or reconstruction of articles or
materials. The data may take a tangible form, such as a
mode, prototype; blueprint or an operating manual (the
tangible form may be stored on any recording media) or they
may take an intangible form such as technical service. ,,111
Exports of technical data are controlled by several
U.S. Government agencies acting under various statutory
authorities112 as well as CoCom. However, the main thrust
of export control is to control critical technology, whether
it is embedded in commodities or in the form of technical
data. It has been said that it is the law and policy of the
United States to place its principal emphasis113 on the
control of exports of critical technical data. It had also
been recommended that the emphasis on national security
export controls be changed from the control of commodities
to the identification and control of technology critical to
US military superiority. 114 However, in practice, export
controls on technical data do not take precedence,
administratively or in the minds of exporters, over similar
controls on commodities. 115
Whatever the case may be, it hardly makes any
difference when critical technology is involved. If there is
any difference, the difference exists only in emphasis and
administration. The major statute and regulation currently
governing export control (both exports of commodities and
technical data) are the Export Administration Act of 1979,
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as amended and reauthorized by the Export Administration
Amendment Act of 1985 and the DOC Export Administration
Regulation.
2. The Export Administration Act of 1979
Before discussing the changes to EAA 1979 made by the
EAAA 1985, it is necessary to examine and to understand the
original EAA 1979. Since it was reauthorized into law by the
EAAA 1985, 116 EAA 1979 still remains a fundamental legal
document in export control.
(a). Jurisdiction of Exports
The administration of exports is divided between DOC
and State Department. The export of commodities and
technical data that are uniquely designed for military
application falls exclusively under the jurisdiction of
state Department's Office of Munitions Control (OMC). The
exports of nearly everything else are administered by DOC's
Office of Export Administration (OEA). 117 Such
jurisdiction covers items for pure commercial use as well as
"dual-use" items. Although OMC and OEA's jurisdictions are
mutually exclusive, the lines are not always easy to follow
by exporters. This is exacerbated by the fact that other
non-administering agencies are also involved. 118 For
example, OMC's munitions control is frequently based on
case-by-case recommendations from 000.119 The Customs
Service of the Treasury Department will also cut in at US
ports of exit. Thus in practice, four cabinet departments
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need to be satisfied in dealing the actual administration of
exports. (DOC. state Department, DOD. Treasury)
(b). What Constitutes "Export", "Reexport" or "Temporary
Export"
The scope of "export" is much broader than the regular
export of mere commodities when technical data is involved.
The technical data is exported by: (a) physically sending
technical data out of the US, (b) permitting the release of
technical data in the us when it is known or expected that
this will result in their transfer to a foreign country, or
(c) releasing US-origin technical data in foreign
country. 120 Since technical data can be intangible it can
be exported or reexported very easily because the term
releasing also includes:
(i) visual inspection by foreign nationals of US-origin
equipment and facilities;
(ii) oral exchanges of information in US or abroad; and
(iii) the application to situations abroad of personal
knowledge or technical expertise acquired in US. 121
An "export" is possible even in transactions taking
place entirely within the US borders, such as releasing
technical data to embassies or affiliates of controlled
countries. 122
Even when a US-origin technology has entered the domain
of foreign countries, the United States still proclaims
control over its reexport. 123 A "reexport" is defined by
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EAR as "reexport, transshipment or diversion" of high
technology from "one foreign destination to another. ,,124
However, the United states sometimes permits temporary
export of goods for purposes of demonstrations, exhibits,
repairs. 125
(c). Export Licensing
The major mechanism set up by OEA in its Export
Administration Regulations (EAR) to regulate the export of
commercial and dual-use commodities and technology is the
licensing system.
There are two kinds of export license: general license
and validated license. Most items may be exported under a
general license, which requires no formal application to or
prior approval from the OEA, so long as applicable shipping
requirements are met, 126 or unless it is subj ect to the
export control of an agency other than DOC. In other words,
it simply means that no export license is needed for such
exports. 127
All items subject to OEA jurisdiction that do not
qualify for a general license require a validated license
for export. The exporter must apply from the OEA for a
validated license. In the official OEA application form, the
exporter must, among other things, describe the goods to be
exported, the identity of the consignee, value of the
transaction, and must also provide an "end-user statement"
which certifies that the products shipped will not be re-
exported without prior authorization. 128
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The Commodity Control List (CCL) is the touchstone of
the OEA's regulations for determining whether or not a
validated license is required for export. 129 CCL is a
highly technical list with over 100,000 entries which are
classified under over 200 categories. It includes a broad
range of goods and technology ranging from computer,
aircraft and their components to electronic devices.
Furthermore, if a good or technology is subject to the
CCL, its spare parts and prototype models are often
separately made subject to the CCL, which makes the CCL even
more difficult for exporters to decipher. 130 Each CCL
entry is accompanied by a description of the item and an
Export Commodity Control Number (ECCN), which consists of
four digits and a letter. The letter (from"A" to "G")
implies the level of restrictions. For example, letter "A"
is the strictest designation, items under which generally
require a validated license to all country destinations,
while those under letter "G" usually can be exported under a
general license, i.e., no modification to and approval from
OEA is required. The letter in ECCN, coupled with the
country of ultimate destination (as decided by country group
designation), will basically determine what type of license
is required for the export of a commodity to a particular
destination. 131
Technical data may also be exported under general
license or validated license. However, OEA has specifically
established two types of general license for exporting
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technical data: one is the "General License-Technical Data
Publically Available" (GTDA), 132 the other is the "General
License-Technical Data-Restricted" (GTDR). 133 GTDA covers
publically available technical data and is usable for all
destinations. Such publically available data includes
technical data that (1) have been made "generally available"
to the public in any form; (2) scientific or educational
data disseminated by instruction in academic institutions
and academic laboratories; 134 (3) patent appl ications
where the contained technical data are wholly of foreign
origin and the application is exported for execution and
return by the foreign inventor. 135
A GTDR may be used to export technical data other than
those exportable under GTDA but which do not require a
Validated License. Two types of technical data are covered
by GTDR: "Operation Technical Data" and "Sales Technical
Data. "136 Another difference between GTDA and GTDR is that
there are detailed and complex written assurance
requirements for GTDR. The written assurance from the
importer should provide that neither the technical data
(except sales technical data) nor the direct product of
technical data will be shipped, directly or indirectly, to
certain Country Groups including China. 137
If neither of these general licenses for exporting
technical data applies, a validated license must be applied
by exporter subject to formal approval by DOC prior to
export. The validated license for exporting technical data
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also seems to be more complicated. For the export of
specific technical data during a designated period to a
specified consignee which requires a validated license, an
Individual Validated License (IVL) is enough. 138 However,
there are times that multiple exportations of the same or
similar technical data are made, and it is impossible
administratively to obtain or issue a large number of IVL;
therefore under these circumstances, for the convenience of
administration, some multiple or bulk validated licenses are
issued to cover certain types of export, service or
marketing programs. 139 These multiple validated licenses
are Comprehensive Operating Licenses (COL) and Project
Licenses (PL). 140
Determination of the type of export license required
for any specific export is made on the basis of (a) the type
of technical data to be exported, (b) the consignee or end-
use of the technical data, and (c) the country to which the
technical data is to be exported. 141
In summary, technical data may be exported under the
following licenses: GTDA, GTDR, IVL, COL and PL.
It should also be pointed out that under the original
EAA 1979, there was also a Qualified General License which
permitted multiple shipments to a particular consignee and
for a specified end-use. 142 However, this was repealed by
the EAAA 1985 and replaced by three other types of licenses
(project license, distribution license and service supply
procedure) •143
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(d). Interagency Review
Obtaining an export license (i.e., a validated license)
may be difficult and time-consuming, since some applications
can not be decided by DOC alone. They may be referred to
other agencies by DOC and subject to review by those
agencies. Such interagency review is designed to minimize
the risk of national security and to assure the optional use
of foreign policy control. Whether or not an application
will be subj ect to review by agencies other than DOC144 is
depended on the product (including end-use), destination,
and total export value. 145
Interagency review may take place through the Advisory
Committee for Export Policy (ACEP), 146 or through less
formal consultation with particular agencies, as
appropriate. 147
DOD has a statutory right to review any license for
export "to any country to which exports are controlled for
national security purposes. ,,148 It may recommend to the
President to disapprove the license application whenever it
determines that "the export of such goods or technology will
make a significant contribution, which would prove
detrimental to the national security of the United states,
to the military potential of any such country. ,,149
Whenever receiving export requests of such kind, DOC shall
notify DOD and DOD shall make its decision not later than 30
days after notification the request. The decisions of DOD
may be to recommend either disapproval, approval subject to
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specific conditions or approval.1~ In case of
disagreement between DOC and DOD, the President has the
final authority to approve or disapprove. 151
The role of Department of state in Interagency review
is to review any license for the export of goods controlled
for foreign policy purposes. 152 In addition to DOD and
DOS, other agencies may also be involved. For example, DOE
will review any export application of a good on the CCL
Nuclear Referral List and any export to a nuclear end-use or
end-user, regardless of the commodity. 153 As to
applications to export commodities or Technical Data to
embargoed countries, they will be reviewed by Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Department of Treasury
(DOT) .154
After interagency review, even though tentative
approval is given by DOC, if further review by CoCom is
required, the application will be submitted to CoCom for a
multilateral review. 155 Sixty days after tentative
approval is given, if multilateral review has not resulted
in a determination with respect to the application, the
tentative approval of DOC shall be final unless DOC decides
issuing the license would be detrimental to the US. 156
CoCom review may be informal and formal, depending on
the items to be exported. 157 An informal review gets
ap~roval automatically unless CoCom raises an objection
during the 30-day period, while a formal approval needs the
unanimous consent of all CoCom members. 158
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(e). Processing Time
The most critical factors to an exporter of technology
are the speed and certainty with which the export licenses
may be obtained. The longer the time, the more uncertainty
it will cause. Obtaining an export license can be time-
consuming. According to one statistic, an export license for
a controversial item td be exported to China may take at the
very minimum some 80 days and a maximum of 524 days. 159
Under the 1979 Act, if an interagency review is
required, OEA is allowed 90 days in which to act upon a
license, including 30 days of initial review by DOC, and 60
days for review by other concerned agencies. 160 When DOC
gets back the application from other agencies, it has
another 90 days from this point within which to take final
action. 161
If CoCom review i~ required, still at least two more
months will be added. 162
However, it should be noted that this whole process,
including interagency review, runs from the time the
application is actually filed. It does not count the time an
exporter has to spend on other required documents before a
license application can be filed. This includes, for
example, the time an exporter has to spend to get the
signature of the consignee or consignee's government on the
"end-user statement. n16:J'
The inefficiency of licensing process has been widely
criticized and complained of. The process has even been
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accused of being an "oligopoly •••• wherein the government
bureaus make bargains among themselves for their own benefit
at the expense of the pUblic". 164
In fact, because of the problem of delay, to increase
licensing efficiency was a principal goal in enacting the
EAAA 1985.'65
(f). Foreign Availability
When a commodity or technical data controlled by US is
readily available to controlled destinations from sources
outside US, it will be futile for the United States to
control it unilaterally; if the US insists in controlling
unilaterally, it will only cause losses to US business.'u
The notion of "foreign availability" was not recognized
until 1969 when the EAA 1969 explicitly provided "that
foreign availability be given considerable weight in
evaluating licensing decision. ,,167 However, the criteria
for determining foreign availability was not defined until
the EAA 1979, which identified as foreign available "any
goods or technologies that are available in fact to such
destinations from such sources in sufficient quantity and of
sufficient quality so that the requirement of a validated
license •.•. would be ineffective in achieving the purpose of
the statute. ,,168
This is the "foreign availability" exception to U.S.
high-tech export controls. The claim of foreign availability
may only be submitted by export license applicants within
ninety days after the initial denial. 169 However, current
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regulations regarding foreign availability apply only to
national security control and not to foreign policy control. 170
Besides, despite a finding of foreign availability, DOC in
consultation with DOD or the President may determine
granting of a license will be detrimental to national
security. In such a case the President will then negotiate
with other exporting countries and attempt to eliminate the
foreign availability. 171
The area of foreign availability has also seen
significant changes made by the EAAA 1985.172
3. Major Changes Made by EAAA 1985
According to a report by the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) of the Congress, the new changes were all
made in order to best accommodate the following four goals:
(1) trade promotion (2) efficiency (3) foreign policy; and
(4) national security.1~
Because numerous changes1~ have been made by EAAA
1985, only changes which reflect the first two goals, in
particular those regarding foreign availability and
licensing efficiency, will be discussed here.
(a). Changes Regarding Foreign Availability
The changes in the concept of foreign availability is
one of the few changes made in order to promote trade.1~
Many observers believed the changes in foreign availability
held the most promise for accommodating the competing goals
of promoting u.s. exports and protecting national
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security.1~ In particular, the following changes were
made:
(1) standards of foreign availability determination
were modified. The language "sufficient" quality in the
original standard was striken out and replaced by
"comparable" quality. That means an item will be
decontrolled even if it is not identical to the US item but
has the same capability.1n However, the language
"sufficient" quantity remains the same.178 Some new
elements, such as cost, reliability were added for
consideration in making determination of foreign
availability. 179
(2) Burden of proof clearly rested on government.
According to EAAA 1985, to preclude foreign availability
claim, DOC, not the exporter, has to prove to the exporter
that the claimed item is not available in foreign markets.
Although the exporter still needs to provide all details
required, DOC should accept exporter's representations about
foreign availability unless DOC can find contradictory
evidence. 180
(3) Establishment of Office of Foreign Availability.
Because the modifications of foreign availability
standards would be meaningless without improving the
administration of the foreign availability process, 181
.Office of Foreign Availability (OFA) was established under
DOC in an attempt to increase DOC's role in foreign
availability determinations. 182 The OFA is responsible for
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gathering and analyzing all information necessary for making
determinations of foreign availability.1~ However, the
Act also reflected the balance of power between DOC and 000
by involving DOD in the same process. DOD may object to
DOC's positive decision about foreign availability on the
grounds that decontrol would be detrimental to national
security. 184
(4) President must negotiate to eliminate foreign
availability.
In case the President determines that decontrol of an
item is detrimental to US national security in spite of its
foreign availability, the Act requires the President to
enter into negotiations with other countries to eliminate
such foreign availability. 185 If foreign availability is
not eliminated within six months (although this is
extendable by the President), that item can be exported
without a validated license.1~
However, the new regulations about foreign availability
are not immune from criticisms. The major criticism points
to 000, which construes foreign availability in such a way
as to preclude decontrol in virtually all cases. The
criticism also points to the failure of the Act to fix a
time limit for DOC and 000 negotiation and a time limit for
OFA's processing of Foreign Availability Submission (FAS)
.filed by exporter. 187
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(b). Changes Regarding the Efficiency of Licensing Process
The goal of efficiency ought to be sought by both trade
promoters and those who are worried about national security,
because both sides agree that controls should be
administered in a timely and predictable manner.1~ Thus,
the following changes designed to increase efficiency were
made:
(1) Control to CoCom countries (i.e .. countries subject
to CoCom review) has been relaxed. Validated license
requirement for low-technology export to CoCom destinations
is eliminated. These low technology items are listed in the
Administration Exception Notes of the Control List. 189
Their exports require only notification to non-CoCom
countries which have agreements with the U.S. to maintain
"export restrictions comparable in practice to those
maintained" by the CoCom.190 Also, for exports of high-
tech to CoCom countries, congress has mandated OEA to give
individual license applicants191 certainty in no more than
15 working days, or if necessary, 30 days. 192
(2) Licensing time for exports to non-CoCom countries
has been reduced by one-third. Thus, the whole process,
including interagency review, can now take not longer than
four months, from the time the application is filed, to the
time the license is approved or denied.1~
(3) The time for OEA to reply applicant's written
inquiries about the classification of a commodity or about
the application of export license requirements to a proposed
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transaction or series of transactions has also been
shortened to 10 working days and 30 days respectively. 194
(4) In order to ensure efficiency, the new Act
established congressional oversight on DOC's licensing
activity. As a result, DOC has to report to Congress
periodically. 195
4. The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and Its
provisions Related to China
The Ecport Administration Regulations is a set of
regulations developed by DOC under the authority of EAA to
implement the EAA.
On November 23, DOC published amendments to the EAR
(the 1983 Amended Regulations), which is to implement the
more liberal export control policy towards China. The major
change of the Amendment is to move China from Group P to
Group V, which reflects President Reagan's decision in May,
1983 to place China in Group V with certain other friendly
countries.1% After China was placed into Group V,
President Reagan also established an interagency steering
group on technology transfer to China, chaired by National
Security Council (NSC), which further assigned DOC the
responsibility of developing new technical guidelines to be
used by the US government in its licensing decisions for
products and technology to China. 197
The new China policy is said to accomplish the
following goals:
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"The establishment of clear and predictable guidelines
for technology transfer, the streamlining of the licensing
process enabling the Government to make much prompter
decisions as to whether a product can or cannot be licensed
to the PRC, and the establishment of substantially increased
technological levels for products and technologies
consistent with the national security concerns.,,1~
When China was in Group P, the general US licensing
policy was "to approve export licenses for goods at
significantly higher technical levels than for country
Groups Q, W, and Y (generally twice those previously
approved for the PRC).,,199 However, the general policy
toward China in Group V is to approve all applications
unless there is a "reasonable basis to believe" that the
items will be diverted to another end-user or to another
destination contrary to the U.S. national interest. 200
However, for exports or reexports of those goods restricted
for national security and nuclear nonproliferation purposes
as well as exports or reexports of some goods with specific
technology of particular strategic significance, a validated
license is required for Group V by EAR. 201 Some Group V
nations are also subject to validated license for foreign
policy purposes but this does not include China. 202
As to exportation of technical data, the restriction on
exports to China were broader than the EAR controls on
export of commodities. 203 While China was in Group P, the
use of GTDR to export technical data to China was prohibited
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except when the technical data to be exported is operation
or service data accompanying a licensed commodity exported
or used in an actual bid to sell commodities.2~ However,
under the new pOlicy, GTDR license may be used to export
most proprietary data relating to industrial processes to
China. 205
China under Group V also has more opportunities to
receive reexports of technical data from previously
authorized countries. 206 However, the use of GTDR for
exports to PRC is still prohibited when the technical data
is related to any goods controlled for national security,
nuclear-nonproliferation, or crime-control reasons. 207
Under the new export control regulations toward China,
new technical guidelines had also been developed by the
interagency committee chaired by DOC in order to streamline
licensing to China. The new technical guidelines have
established three zones to guide licensing decisions: Green
Zone, Intermediate Zone (Yellow Zone) and Red Zone.
According to Secretary Baldrige's description:
License applications within Green Zone "will receive,
for the most part, routine approval." DOD will delegate
review authority to commerce and no interagency review will
be necessary. These applications will represent minimum
national security risk, yet they account 75 per cent of all
PRC appl ications. 208
Applications within intermediate zone will be for "very
high technology and will require case-by-case review" by DOD
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or other agencies. "We may approve licenses within this
zone unless the commodity or technology poses a clear threat
to the US security interests.,,209
The red zone includes the most advanced technologies
which the US usually would not share even with its closest
allies. License application within this zone will have a
"strong presumption for denial. ,,210
The technical guidelines already developed govern the
following seven technology areas considered most important
to China's modernization program: computers, computerized
instruments, .microcircuits, electronic instrument, recording
equipment, semi-conductor production equipment and
oscilloscopes.211 However, guidelines for areas other than
the above seven are continuing to be developed. 212
A move was upcoming to further liberalize the export
control system for China through the development of a "core
list" that would identify items barred to China, allowing
export of all other. However, Tienanmen Square Massacre
brought this to a halt.213 This "core list" would have
replaced the three-zone distinction.
The liberalization of control of US export to China was
also accompanied by efforts to liberalize multilateral
control of export to China by CoCom and to speed up its
licensing. These efforts were made in response to the
dramatic increase in the number of China submission due to
US liberalization and with the intention of CoCom members to
establish a differential within CoCom on China that would
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allow for a more liberalized pOlicy.214 In July 1984,
CoCom member reached an agreement on a uniform control
program for the export of certain commodities to the Soviet,
Eastern Europe and China. The results of this agreement are
the decontrol of certain products, and that the exports of
some sophisticated commodities which used to require
decision by CoCom, now became a matter of discretion for
member nations. 215 In February 1985, US further initiated
negotiation with CoCom countries, with the objective of
raising the technical levels of proposed exports requiring
CoCom review for exports to China only. This resulted in
the October 1985 CoCom agreement.216 The effect of this
agreement was to dramatically differentiate China from
Soviet and Eastern Europe as regards to review requirements
for proposed exports of similar commodities. For a number
of controlled commodities, US may license exports to China
without referral to CoCom (i.e., eligible for Green Zone
license), which is not the case for Soviet and Eastern
Europe. 217 Initially, these commodities include twenty-
seven items.218 In August 1986, three more items were
added. 219 However, CoCom will probably act more cautiously
after Tienanmen Square Massacre in liberalizing its China
policy.
Although China has been classified under Country Group
V, there are still special restrictions imposed on exports
to China which are not imposed on other Group V countries.
The different treatments between China and other Group V
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countries can be seen from the following aspects:
1) the use of general license GLV. General License GLV
(General License for Shipment of Limited Value) is one among
a series of general export licenses established by EAR. 220
General license GLV permits the export of controlled
commodities in limited value (generally $1000 or less) to
destinations in Country Group T and V without the necessity
of a specific validated export license. The use of General
License GLV for export to China under Country Group P was
limited to the value of $0. This limitation remained the
same even after China was moved to Group V. 221 The
restriction is consistent with OEA's policy of continuing to
examine each proposed export of controlled commodities and
technology to China on a case-by-case basis ;222
2) use of Distribution License. In order to facilitate
multiple export transactions involving commodities for which
a validated license is required, Distribution License (DL)
is established as one of several multiple export licenses to
permit the exporter to make repeated exports over a period
of two years (subject to renewal for an additional two
years) of controlled commodities to approved consignees in
specified destinations. 223 Although DL is available to
Group T and V countries only, China is expressly denied the
availability of DL.224 However, in 1984, an informal
procedure was established by DOC and DOD to grant
"individual" validated export licenses authorizing multiple
shipments of relatively low-level computers and related
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peripherals for distribution in China;225 A plan to grant
DL to China was set to be implemented by the summer of 1989.
But the Tienanmen Square Massacre resulted in an indefinite
suspension of this plan. 226
3) special documentation requirements for computer
exports and certain machine tool and numerical controls
exports. An exporter who intends to export computers (ECCN
1565A) to Country Group Q,W,Y,and P must submit a number of
special documentation together with the application for a
validated export license. 227 These required documentation
include, for example, the computers' parameters on Form ITA-
6031P; detailed information about the software to be
supplied for use with the computers; etc.228 China under
Group V are exempted from these requirements. However,
China is singled out from Group V and remains subject to
certain documentation requirements for the export of certain
machine tool and numerical controls equipments ;229
Export of technical data to China under Group V can now
be made under general license GTDR. However, as noted
earlier, such general license GTDR is not available for the
export to China of any technical data related to any
commodity that is controlled for national security, nuclear
non-proliferation or crime control reasons. 230 This is
also at variance with treatment other Group V countries get.
An example is the export of computer software which is
included in the definition of technical data.231 Although
most computer software has been exportable under General
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License GTDR to Group T and V countries, China remains to
be ineligible for GTDR after the 1983 EAR Amendment and is
subject to validated license requirement.~2
Despite these specific restrictions, the new China
policy has achieved remarkable effects in terms of license
value and the number of closed out exports to China. The
dollar value grew by 15 times, from $374.3 million in 1980
to $5,493 million in 1985, though it declined to $3,366
million in 1986.233
The number of applications more than doubled between
1983 and 1985, rising from 4300 to 10,200. In 1986, a tota
of 8,130 cases (including temporary licenses) were closed
out for export to China. 234 In terms of efficiency,
however, although DOC had taken several steps to speed up
the review, 235 and improvements have been achieved in
average processing time for China cases, significant
problems remain. 236 Average processing time for referral
cases took more than 200 days in December ,1986, and remain
significantly longer than the time taken for reviewing
exports to other countries. The last quarter of 1986 saw
about 30% of the closed out, referred China cases exceedin~
the statutory limit.237 The average processing time for
CoCom review declined from 77 to 56 days between January ar
June of 1986 but rose to 81 days in the first quarter of
1987.238
After the Tienanmen Square Massacre, the processing
time again saw an increase at DOC due to the increased
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scrutiny of export application for high-tech, dual-use
commercial products. The processing time at DOC alone has
increased by at least one week. Additional review time will
certainly be added at 000 and other agencies. 239
5. CoCom
The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (CoCom) plays such an important role in Western
controls of exports to Communist countries that it deserves
separate discussion.
The genesis of CoCom dated back to World War II when
the US entered into discussion with its key European allies
concerning a coordinated embargo policy toward the Soviet
bloc. 240 It was born after secret and informal
negotiations in late 1949 among seven nations: US, Britain,
France, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. 241
It began operation on January 1, 1950 and was later joined
by eight other nations. 242 However, an effective embargo
against Communist countries requires not only the
participation of the above nations, but also the
cooperation, if not participation of all the rest non-
Communist nations. Throughout the years, US has quite
successfully gained the cooperations of all the non-
Communist countries in the embargo policy. Thus, the real
embargo ally is far larger than that suggested by the CoCom
membership. 243
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The main functions of CoCom involve four interrelated
aspects: agreement on strategic criteria for controls;
formulation of a detailed list of embargoed items;
evaluation of individual cases for possible exception from
the embargo; and coordination of efforts to assure
enforcement of the embargo. 244
The main objective of CoCom initially was to control
strategic goods and technology and prevent their flow into
Communist countries. However, as time passed by, the policy
emphasis has gradually shifted to the control of selective
advanced technology with potential military application. 245
Under its control pOlicy, CoCom had developed an
embargo list (the CoCom List) 246 which is not public and
subject to review in about every three years. Additions or
deletions were made to the list taking into account of the
technological advances and the availability to controlled
destinations of controlled goods and technology from non-
CoCom sources. 247
Although items on the CoCom List are generally not
exportable to Communist countries, export of an item on the
list could be made by utilizing the CoCom exception
procedure. The basic purpose of the exception procedure is
to permit a specific export of an item to a controlled
destination if security risk of the transaction is
acceptable. 248 Such determination requires the unanimous
agreement of the member countries represented at the CoCom
meeting to decide the exception request. It also takes into
129
account of the end-use, political harm of the transfer and a
lot of other military, economic and political factors.249
A 1978 report cited that 1000 exception cases were submitted
annually and half of them were from us. Two to four percent
of them would be denied and three to five percent would be
withdrawn. 250
Since CoCom was created by an informal agreement, it
exists as a voluntary arrangement which does not obligate
the participants internationally. Consequently, each member
implements CoCom policy through its domestic legislation,
although they have no legal obligation to do so. Besides,
the decisions of CoCom are not binding and they "literally
mean(s) nothing in international terms", if member nation
does not choose to implement the decision. 251
Notwithstanding such fragile legal and organizational
structure,252 amazingly, CoCom has continued as an
important and effective trade control mechanism for over 40
years. All member nations have also shown substantial
cooperations, which have been based on the common interest
of denying strategic technology and goods to the Communists.
However, CoCom's effectiveness is still limited by a
number of factors. Although there are cooperations, there
have also been outright transfer of technology in violation
of CoCom regulations by member countries. Differences in
national export control policies between individual member
nations and a lot of other problems inherent in the CoCom
system also severely reduced the effectiveness of CoCom. 253
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Throughout CoCom's history, CoCom member nations have had
different views on technology transfer. While European
members plus Japan view technology transfer as a trade issue
and are more concerned as such, the US views it mainly as a
security issue, therefore, there had been disagreements over
the range of technologies that should be controlled; over
the interpretations of CoCom rules and lists; and over the
enforcement of multilateral controls.254 CoCom itself also
has inherent organizational problems. For example:
inefficiency in administration of the multilateral export
control system, lack of enforcing mechanism and a
multilateral mechanism to harmonize different national
export control policies, failure to adjust CoCom to
technology advancement timely, etc. 255 These problems
exacerbated the ineffectiveness of CoCom.
CoCom is also facing other challenges. There have been
charges that CoCom is "an obsolete organization" and should
be disbanded. 256 There had even been challenges to the
very legality of CoCom because "the freedom of export is one
of the fundamental human rights which guarantees an aspect
of the freedom 0 f bus iness •.." .257 within CoCom, European
countries and Japan question whether US uses CoCom to its
own advantage.258 Each country also appears to be somewhat
suspicious of the others, especially about the
interpretations of technical stipulations on exports and
tactics used in CoCom.259 Such conflicts tend to increase
as the US economic dominance declined. The economic
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leverage US enjoyed in the early years following the WWII
was the glue that initially held CoCom together.2~
However, despite all the challenges and conflicts
facing CoCom, it is very unlikely that CoCom will fall apart
or cease to exist, because, first, there is always consensus
within CoCom against transferring strategic goods and
technology to Communist countries especially the soviet
bloc, which transfer will endanger the Western security or
increase the Western military expenditure; secondly, the
very informal nature of CoCom could also have been the very
factor that had held CoCom together, because "problems
between governments have traditionally been worked out
quietly at very high policy levels". 261 In fact, it is the
introduction of coercive legislation into CoCom that should
be avoided because such statutory mandating (instead of the
present informal gentlemen's agreement) is sure to be
resented and also likely to be of dubious efficacy;262
thirdly, the differences among CoCom members are non-
fundamental. All countries agree that things will be
different if there is no CoCom.2~ Although French
corporation are generally not as concerned about security
aspects of technology exports as U.S.2M and France had
even threatened to withdraw from cocom,265 it agrees that
CoCom is a "useful organization because it acts as a brake
on technology transfer". 266
CoCom's control of exports to China has been relaxed
almost concurrently with the liberalization of us control on
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export to China. 267 However, CoCom control had been
somewhat less restrictive than the US export control policy
because Western Europe and Japan had traditionally been less
restrictive in technology transfer to China 2~ and US has
traditionally maintained a larger control list than the
CoCom list. 269
As discussed earlier, in October 1985 CoCom reached an
agreement to preclude certain items exported to China from
review by CoCom.2ro This favorable treatment was not
granted to any other Communist country besides China. with
the liberalization of Controls on exports to China by US and
other CoCom countries, CoCom's China policies should be
reviewed more frequently and treatment of China should be
considered in light of development in its overall relations
with the West. 271 Concurrently, there is controversy as to
whether China should be removed totally from CoCom review if
the West's relations with China continue to improve and
China's economy continues to grow. Totally removing China
from CoCom review would "send a positive signal indicating
full acceptance of China as a trading partner by the West",
this would have the advantage of resulting in "expanded
trade in high-technology sectors that now exceed green-zone
guidelines".272 The finding that transfers of dual-use
technologies are likely to have only limited effects on
China's military capability in the near term also supports
the prediction that totally removing China from CoCom is not
likely to cause hazardous effects to Western security, at
133
least not in the near term.2n However, the opposing party
argues that nobody can guarantee that China will not shift
dramatically to the Soviet's side; that CoCom has played an
important role in deterring military exports to China and
enhancing the East Asian security; that at present there is
simply no overwhelming evidence to support total removal of
China from CoCom review and not all CoCom countries will
support such a move, either.2~ It is the author's belief
that in the foreseeable future, the latter arguments will
probably prevail and China will remain subject to CoCom
review for yet a substantial period of time in the future.
This should be true even without the Tienanmen
Massacre. The massacre lends strong support to the arguments
of those who support CoCom review of China exports.
Following tragedy, US and the European Community imposed
various sanctions against China, including a freeze on arms
sales to China. Although CoCom has not, as of October 1989,
changed its policy of controlling exports to China only for
strategic purposes, by now those who proposed for total
removed of China from CoCom review would have changed their
mind.
Chapter Summary
The United States technology policy toward China has
evolved from total embargo of trade with China, to gradual
relaxation in the late 60's and early 70's. After the
normalization of relationship between the two countries in
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1979, the united states began to liberalize control on
exports of technology and commodities to China. In 1981,
China was promoted from Country Group Y to its own group-
Group P. As the two nations' relations further improved, us
began to regard China as a friendly, non-allied country,
therefore in 1983, China was placed in Country Group V,
together with other friendly countries including Western
Europe and non-Communist Asia.
The legal framework governing us export controls
consists principally of the Export Administration Act (EAA).
The EAA has gone through several generations and the current
one is the Export Administration Amendment Act of 1985 (EAAA
1985) which, besides reauthorizing EAA 1979, made a number
of changes to accommodate the new circumstances. The main
mechanism of controlling exports under this legal framework
is the export licensing system. Different types of license
are issued for exports to different destinations depending
on the technological level, destination, end-use, foreign
availability and other military, economic and political
considerations. An application for validated license may be
subject to interagency review. DOC, 000, DOS are major
agencies involved in such review process. If an export is
subject to CoCom review under the multilateral export
control agreement, the application must be further submitted
to CoCom for a decision. The licensing review process had
caused serious delay in granting an export license for
export to China. Although steps have been taken both in us
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and within CoCom to alleviate delay, problems still exist
and a proposed export to China may particularly be time-
consuming.
CoCom has played an important role in multilateral
control of technology exports from West to China. Although
there are conflicts within CoCom, it will not fall apart or
disband, at least not in the near future. CoCom's China
policy has been liberalized sUbstantially, however, it is
unlikely that CoCom will cease to review China cases
completely.
The recent Tienanmen Square Massacre affected both US
and CoCom's technology export policy toward China. But from
a long-term view, the effects will only be temporary.
Nevertheless, this historical event has lent great force to
those who advocate more control on exporting technology to
China, both inside the US and inside CoCom.
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26. The embargo might not have gone further had the Korean
War not broken. See suora note 21, at 4.
27. Seabolt, United States Technoloqy Exoorts to the
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71. Statement of Secretary Baldrige, suora note 55, at 5.
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79. Id., at 256.
80. Id., at 256.
81. Hearings before the Committee on Science and Technology,
US House of Rep., 96th Cong., 1st sess. Technology Transfer
To China, Nov. 13 & 15,1979, at 7. This is the so-called
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89. Different emphasis on these parameters may lead to
different themes under the overall policy. One theme is to
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bargaining chip in U.S.- China relations (the technology
leverage approach); a third would be to emphasize the
multilateral aspects of export control and trade with China
(Multilateral approach). For a detail discussion of these
three approaches, see id, at 199-203.
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103. Wall Street Journal, June 28, 1989, at A3, col. 1.
144
104. Gillespie and Shea, The Militarv Sales Ban, THE CHINA
BUS. REV. September-october, 1989, at 32-33.
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their juriSdictions. For example: (1). narcotics and
dangerous drugs are controlled by the Drug Enforcement
Administration of the Justice Department; (2). commodities
subject to the Atomic Energy Act are controlled by the US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the US Department of
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(ITAR 22 C.F.R. section 120.10(c)-10(e) and section125.2(c).
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note 109, at 61-2.
130. Gonzalez, supra note 10, at 421.
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139. Letterman, suora note 109, at 81.
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shipments under long-term contracts from a domestic concern
to and among its foreign affiliates, joint-verdure and for
which no implementing EAR regulations have yet been issued.
50 USCA section 2403 (a) (2)(B) (West 1986).
A Project License is for multiple shipments over time
to a large special project. 50 USCA section 2403 (a) (2) (c)
(West, 1986). See also suora note 102, at 81-82 n.88 and
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153. 15 C.F.R. section 378. Supp.1 (1986).
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Id., at 423-24.
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163. Id.
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171. IQ., at 1179. See also 15 C.F.R. section 391.4(a) (5) &
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[objectives]." See also Off. Tech. Assessment, Congo of the
U.S. Technoloqy and East-West Trade: An Update iii, (1983)
(hereinafter "OTA 1983").
174. For a detailed discussion of the changes made by EAAA
1985, see Gonzalez, supra note 10, at 426-502.
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funding. Gonzalez, supra note 10, at 430, 434. 438.
176. Note, supra note 9, at 591.
177. So the version after change reads: "••.•in any case in
which the Secretary determines, ... that any such goods or
technology are available in fact to such destinations from
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validated license." See also Gonzalez, supra note 10, at
428.
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179. EAAA 1985 Pub. L. NO.99-64,(99 Stat.129) section 107
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Gonzalez, supra note 10, at 442.
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194. Id.
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196. McKenzie, supra note 50, at 318.
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CHAPTER III
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONTRACT
INTRODUCTION
It is not enough for a Chinese party or an American
party to know each other's technology policy and legal
framework governing technology import or export. An
agreement has to be reached to effectuate an actual transfer
of technology.
This chapter will discuss the legal aspects of
negotiating such a technology transfer contracts between the
American tranferor and the Chinese transferee.
Since most of the technology transfer contracts are
negotiated and signed in China, this chapter will alslo
generally describe the Chinese contractual policy and
practice. A clause-by-clause description of the contents of
a typical technology transfer contract will be presented to
further illustrate the Chinese positions on each issue and
the problems both parties have encountered or would
encounter in each area. They are not exhaustive, but only
to offer insights on the major contract issues, for American
licensors, as well as Chinese licensees.
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A. CHINESE CONTRACTUAL POLICY AND PRACTICE
1. The Importance of Contract
Contract is important in a transaction where the
governing law does not exist. Before the enact ion of the
Chinese patent law, the protection of foreign patents or
know-how was mainly provided by contract on a transaction-
by-transaction basis. Therefore, it was exclusively "within
the four corners of the contract" negotiated by the parties
that the licensor obtained patent and know-how protection
which he would normally have received under statutes in
other countries. 1 Because the lack of a Chinese commercial
code, quite often the only source available to govern the
rights and duties of the parties is the contract itself. In
this sense the contract is the "law" governing the
transaction2 and has legal effect. Even when there is a
governing the law, contract is still an important legal
document for the parties, since many Chinese laws only
consist of general principles and leave the details to be
negotiated by the contracting parties. As one observer
noted, the codified laws are generally "vague, brief and
loosely constructed".3 Therefore, the careful
negotiation and drafting of a technology licensing contract
is of vital importance to a licensor as well as to licensee.
The Chinese generally are diligent in performing
contracts, because they believe this is the best way to
develop close and mutually profitable relationship,4
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which the Chinese have traditionally cherished. One author
stated that in performing their contract duties, "the
Chinese have shown as much good faith as most foreign or
domestic licensees, with the risk of a Chinese licensee's
breach being intensified only by distance and undefined or
nonexistent procedures."s
However, the parties should now be aware of the Foreign
Economic Contract Law (FECL) and Economic Contract Law (ECL)
of the People's Republic of China - the two main codified
laws governing all contracts when a Chinese party is
involved. 6 The parties should also be aware of the
bilateral treaties existed between China and US which
provide protection for intellectual properties, such as the
US-China Trade Agreement.7
2. Form Contract
The Chinese, as do many foreign businessmen, find
simple form contracts perfectly adequate8 and insist on
the use of form contract for most international
transactions. In international trade, the form contract is
not uncommon. It is used to meet the common need of traders
to minimize risks of international transactions and the need
for uniformity of commercial practice. However, the Chinese
when using the standard form contract seem to be motivated
by other reasons. They are more concerned about the need to
insure inviolability of their sovereignty and to keep
initiative in their own hands.9 It is their belief that
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the complex style of Western statutes and codes is to keep
the law unintelligible to the people and the Western legal
drafting "allows evasion of the intent and spirit of law and
tends to make the populace litigious. ,,10
The Chinese standard form contract is so brief that
normally the only negotiable terms are price and quantity.
It does not contain a choice of law clauses.11 It also
precludes the use of parol evidence from interpreting the
contract and limits the interpretation within the four
corners of the contract itself if there is not a governing
law.12 In the form contract China also refuses to consider
the possibility of bad faith or improper dealing on its own
part in the performance of the contract.13
Some Western commentators found such a practice
unacceptable and suggested that China abandon its
standardized form contract in favor of negotiating each
contract separately or develop a workable commercial
code.14 However, such a suggestion would be too western
for the Chinese to accept now. A more reasonable suggestion
would be that China use its standard form as a basis for
negotiation, allowing easy modification and expansion where
needed, since form contract has the advantage of reducing
lengthy negotiation and encouraging trust and business
honesty, while developing a separate national commercial
code would be contrary to the objective of international
traders to ensure more uniformity, because the first step to
insure uniformity is to "prefer the law of the contract to
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that of any national legal system" in interpreting
international contracts.15
China's practices in recent years seems to demonstrate
that China is adopting a more flexible attitude in
negotiating its international contract.
3. China's Foreign Trade Organizations and Other
Organizations Involved in Technology Import
The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
(MOFERT) is the central organization in China's foreign
trade. It was organized in 1982 from several other
organizations including the former Ministry of Foreign
Trade. 16 The major responsibility of MOFERT is to help the
state Planning Commission (SPC) formulate national trade
plans, to negotiate international trade agreements, to
participate in international trade organizations.17 Its
role in China'importation of foreign technology is to
provide policy advice on China's needs for a given
technology; to approve the language of a technology transfer
contract; to propose new regulations or revise and clarify
existing technology regulations; and to certify Chinese end
users of sensitive high-teCh (PRC End-User Certificate) in
accordance with the CoCom 1985 agreement.18
There are 16 national Foreign Trade Corporations (FTC)
which act as independent legal entities but under the
supervision of MOFERT (there are also other FTCs under other
industrial ministries). Prior to 1982, these FTCs were the
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only entities authorized to negotiate trade contracts. Even
after the decentralization of foreign trade apprartus began
in 1979, the FTCs are still responsible for negotiating and
conducting the major portion of China's foreign trade. They
act as middlemen for Chinese end-users and sometimes sign
contract in conjunction with end-users.19 They are
normally organized to handle specific commodities or
services and can delegate their responsibilities to their
brances. The key FTC in China's technology import is the
China National Technical Import Corporation (TechImport).2o
The China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade (CCPIT) is a non-government organization majorly
involved in trade promoting activities such as holding trade
fairs, trade exhibitions, sending and hosting trade
delegates, etc. It is the Chinese version of international
Chamber of Commerce. ~
Other important organizations in technology transfer
decision-making besides MOFERT are: the state Planning
Commision (SPC) , which formulates technology import plan;
the state Economic Commision (SEC) which has special
responsibility for technical transformation through its
Technical Transformation Bureau (TTB); and the state Science
and Technology Commision (SSTC) which is centrally involved
in importing technology for national research and
technological develop~nt projects, besides setting national
technology policy. 21
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4. China's Foreign Trade Policy
In any international trade, including contract
negotiation, the Chinese strictly hold to three foreign
trade policies: " the policy of independence and keeping
initiative in their own hands, the policy of equality and
mutual benefit, the policy of taking into consideration
international practice. ,,22Any foreign businessman
intending to deal with the Chinese should be aware of these
three principles.
The first principle is the natural and direct result of
China's experience in the "century of humiliation"(1840-
1949).23 The Chinese would not hesitate to sacrifice a
deal in order to protect its sovereignty and
independence. 24 All foreign trade will be concluded only
after careful consideration of its effects on Chinese
interests and practices. However, stated in other words,
this principle expresses no more than China's intention to
"take advantage of the world market while protecting its own
integrity" just as any nations does.25 In this sense,
there is no peculiarity to this Chinese policy.
The second policy reflects one of the traditional
Chinese philosophy "Li", the essence of which is that
friends deal with each other with sincerity, not from a
power base, but rather as equals, considering the needs of
each other.26 This is an unusual concept in international
trade, because on the international market place, it is
taken for granted that most parties deal with each other at
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arms-length and utilize their power and position to their
best advantage. 27
The third principle is the recognition by the Chinese
that, from a practical view, China must recognize
international business practice and business custom in order
to do business in the international community28, i.e.,
China must compromise its principle of sovereignty and
independence with international practice and custom to a
degree that business with foreign countries are possible.
Whenever these principles are in conflict, the principle of
equality and mutual benefit will guide the process and
degree of compromise. 29
5. Negotiation Process and Style
(a) pre-Negotiation: Contact and Exchange of Information
It is often difficult for American licensors to know
the Chinese market, either because there is not much
information there, or because the available information and
data are ambiguous, unofficial and made up of principles
only. One curious thing about the Chinese trade practice is
that they keep their detailed trade and economic plans
almost totally secret after spending great efforts in
devising them. 30
The Chinese have also experienced difficulty in
gathering foreign trade information they need because of
limited manpower, lack of expertise and the absence of an
overall information network. As a result, quite often the
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FTCs purchase from abroad without the benefit of competitive
bids.31
Traditionally, the main fora for exchanging trade
information have been trade exhibitions and trade fairs.
The exhibitions are usually organized by CCPIT to display
foreign products and equipments. They constitute major
commercial events in China. The purpose is to introduce
products and technology to China's technical personnel, who
constitute the majority of visitors to the exhibitions.
Typical Chinese trade exhibitions have the following
features: 1) the exhibitors are often very prestigious and
present the most advanced technology available in fields of
particular interest to the Chinese; 2) some exhibits travel
to more than one city; 3) the exhibits usually provide
hundreds of technical seminars and industrial films along
with demonstrations and displays; 4) technical data and
glossy catalogues, specially printed in Chinese, are
supplied for free and in large quantities; and 5) the
visitors are selected by Chinese government, usually by
invitation only and generally limited to highly qualified
specialists from major manufacturing and research centers.
"In short, the exhibitions make the search for relevant
foreign technology remarkably easy for the Chinese. ,,32
The most famous trade fair is perhaps the biannual
Chinese Export Commodities Fair-the Canton Trade Fair,33
which exhibits both Chinese and foreign goods. Despite its
export purpose, this fair is an important forum for business
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negotiation and large amount of deals are made during each
fair. Many other Chinese cities also started to host "mini"
trade fairs for specialized products.34
As China expands its foreign trade, the channels for
trading have also been expanded. Today, both Chinese and
foreign businessmen have more access to each other's market.
Commercial advertising by foreign firms has become more
common. More foreign firms have established branches in
China. Associations such as the National Council for US-
China Trade (US) and its publication China Business Review
have played important roles in providing American
businessmen information about Chinese market and customers.
Consulates, embassies and other government departments have
also been important channels for exchanging trade
information. 35 The Chinese are also sending more
delegations to visit American plants. Nevertheless, most of
the negotiations are taken place in China because the
Chinese still holds to the tradition (albeit to a lesser
degree) of conducting foreign trade "on China's terms" and
on their own turf.36 Therefore, quite often the foreign
licensors must travel to China either themselves or through
sales literature.u
(b) the Chinese Negotiation Styles
Once both parties have established business contact,
they will get down to business. The Chinese will not invite
a foreign firm to China until they are ready to do serious
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negotiation, although an invitation does not mean an assured
contract. 38
There are usually two phases in a technology transfer
contract negotiation. Technical specialists are invited
first to discuss comprehensively the nature and performance
of the technology and equipment. If the Chinese end-user
feel the technology or equipment are worth purchasing, a
second team will be invited to actually negotiate the
contract.39
The Chinese usually consider a transfer of technology
transaction as the beginning of a longer relationship. "As
part of this relationship, PRC parties expect the foreign
party to work with them to resolve problems that may arise
and, to some extent, share responsibility for such
problems.,,40 Friendship, cooperation, and mutual reliance
are usually emphasized in the agreement. 41
However, the Chinese are known as tough negotiators.42
"They will often steadfastly hold to a position, explaining
only that 'it is not our practice' to accede to a point
pressed by the other side".~ They want to get as much for
their money's worth as possible, because the price of
technology always seems exorbitant to them. During the
negotiation, they also want to extract the maximum amount of
information from licensors,44 sometimes demanding
blueprint or other know-how or other technical information
not normally divulged in the absence of a signed contract or
US export license. Conversely, the Chinese themselves often
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withheld information which the other side deems essential
such as the site of a given plant, because they are
concerned that they may have divulged "state secrets".45
In order to strike a good deal, the Chinese may push
some foreign negotiators to the ends of their patience.46
The negotiations may be very lengthy. During a complex
transaction, the Chinese negotiators may repeatedly consult
with higher authorities on major points and this causes
further delay.47 The negotiation time will range from a
minimum of several months to a maximum of years.48 The
lengthy negotiations have seriously discourage small-to-
medium American firms who want to do business with China.49
B. NEGOTIATION OF CONTRACT PROVISIONS
1. Parties
A u.S. licensor should check the status of his Chinese
counterpart, not only because the US export control law may
require information about the end-user, but also because a
Chinese negotiator may not necessarily be the end-user of
the would-be transferred technology. The Chinese negotiator
may be a FTC which is acting as a middleman.~ As one
author pointed out "it is theoretically possible for a
licensor never to meet the beneficiary of the contract-the
end-user. ,,51Therefore, if the national FTC (e.g. the
Techimport) is negotiating the contract for its
subsidiaries, it is important to have the actual end-user
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involved and sign the contract if possible, since the end-
user (the real licensee ) will control many of the
licensor's concerns such as confidentiality and set-up of
plant or process.52 Also DOC may require the licensor to
provide information about the end-user and may demand the
right to supervise the use of the technology transferred to
the end-user. On the other hand, if the real licensee is
negotiating the contract, it will be helpful for the
American licensor to involve the national FTC or any other
organization under which the licensee is affiliated. The
reason for this is, if the transfer of technology will
require the use of other resources (raw materials,
transportation, energy, etc.), or if the future sale of
product manufactured with the technology will require
distribution throughout China, support from a national
corporation (or even better a government department) will
make things much easier for the licensor.~
The American licensor is also advised to check whether
the Chinese party is legally eligible to negotiate a foreign
trade contract, because a Chinese entity needs to meet two
requirements to enter into a contract with a foreign party,
i.e., it must be a legal person; and it must possess foreign
trade authority. Besides, a licensing contract is often
subject to the approval by an approving authority (usually
MOFERT or its designated authority).M
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2. Language
Communicating with Chinese in Chinese can be trying for
American licensors and their attorneys. Perhaps realizing
the difficulty of their language posed to foreign
businessmen, the Chinese usually brings interpreters during
the negotiation and they normally formalize business
transactions with us firms in straightforward written
English agreements. The parties may also provide that
correspondence as well as other technical documentation be
in English. However, in large-scale transactions, the
practice has been to execute the agreements in both English
and chinese.55 Although normally both Chinese and English
version are equally binding, there is a tendency toward
regarding the Chinese language version as paramount.~
3. Price and PaYment
The Chinese used to view royalties as "exploitative,
monopolistic and capitalistic".57 They always see the
price tag as too exorbitant.~ This may be due to two
reasons: first, the high value of dollar comparing to the
low value of the Chinese Renminbi (RMB) and the general low
living standard and commercial exchange in China; second,
the Chinese tend to perceive licensing as a transfer of
documents instead of a transfer of the technology and know-
how represented by the documents.59 Since the profit to be
realized from the sale of the product or equipment
represents a return not only on the manufacture of the
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product but also on the investment in R & D of the
technology behind it,~ the Chinese often fail to see the
latter part as well as the value of the know-how and
personal skills involved in the transfer.
As the Chinese party persistently pushes down the
price, the American licensor may face the dilemma of either
having to lower his price and risk losing his profit, or
"stand his ground and risk losing not only the deal, but
access to a market of vast potential importance. ,,61
However, quite often the Chinese attract the licensor by
promising more future business and use the huge Chinese
market as a bait to break down the price. Such tactic had
been successful usually.
The Chinese also resent price escalation clause in the
contract, although they have been willing to add inflation
into the one-time fixed cost.~ A price clause in a
typical current licensing agreement consists of initial fee
and a certain percentage of royalty as the contract
price. 53
It should be noted that the Implementing Details of the
Regulations on Administration of Technology Import Contracts
of the People's Republic of China (the" Implementing
Details") expressly state that a contract which contains
"unreasonable" price and payment will not be approved.54
Also, if raw materials and parts have to be transferred
together with the equipment or technology, their price
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should not exceed the price of like products on the
international market. 65
Once a price is agreed, the Chinese are usually willing
to pay. PaYment used to be made in cash for everything
bought.~ However, new forms of paYment such as bank
credits, and compensation trade (paYment by part of the
manufactured goods) are now used. The credit rating of the
Bank of China and general Chinese buyers is exceptionally
good and foreign sellers "have seldom, if ever, been
dissatisfied with the Chinese speed of paYment".67
The Implementing Details also insists that the ways of
paYment be "reasonable", 68 and the ways of paYment, like
price, must be stipulated in a contract.~
4. Delivery
The Chinese normally buy F.O.B. or FAS, but they also
buy on basis of C.I.F •• They are very cautious about the
delivery of goods, especailly in large and complex
transactions. They demand a detailed delivery schedule and
advance notice of each shipment, as well as name of the
carrying vessel, shipping agent, and marks of each crate,
etc. Other precise information on the shipping containers
or crates, such as contract number, consignee code, case
number, weight and measurement, etc. are also specified in
the contract. Costs incurred in the first 30 days by delay
of shipment will be charged to the seller. The buyer will
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also charge seller costs attributable to the seller's
failure to ship by the designated vessel.
The Chinese buyer also demands uttermost care be given
to the packing of goods or equipment, and there is usually a
clause in the contract requiring same.70 Seller should be
liable for any damage caused by improper packing.
5. Inspection and Acceptance
The Chinese usually insist the right of final
inspection of the equipment exported to China. This is a
notable instance of uneven application of the principle of
"equality and mutual benefit" since they do not allow
foreign seller the right of final inspection. 71 If
discrepancies are found between the equipment and the
specification of the contract, the Chinese buyer has the
"right to claim for replacement with new goods or for
compensation, and all the expenses (such as inspection
charges, freight, insurance, storage, loading and unloading)
shall be borne by the seller". 72 In the alternati ve, the
Chinese buyer may reject the goods within 60 days.73 The
evidence for such claim and rejection is the certificate
issued by the Chinese Commodity Inspection Bureau (CCIB).
The CCIB has earned a reputation for "meticulousness and
objectivity" in its inspection procedures. 74 Some
commodities that could be measured by weight in the West may
be counted by hand individually by the Chinese. They stick
to the contract to such a degree as to be "compulsively
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honest".75 For example, they would complain discrepancy
even if foreign supplier shipped, at no extra cost, newer
models of machinery than those specified in the contract.76
The requirements insisted by the Chinese as buyer and
those insisted when they are seller are often unequal and
non-reciprocal, which further raise suspicions to the
principle of "equality and mutual benefit". As a buyer, the
Chinese party demands an equipment or commodity with "best
materials" and "first class workmanship warranted for a
certain period of time", but as a seller, China will only be
responsible for "badworkmanship" or faulty materials,
while no warranty is offered, either.77 Obviously, the
Chinese are trying to get more favorable treatment both as
buyer and as seller. Such unequal dual practice has caused
doubt among foreign traders as to the sincerety of Chinese
motives. 78 Therefore, in order to have better business
relationship with foreign traders, China should abandon such
non-reciprocal practice.
6. Guaranty of Claims by Seller
The scope and requirement for the technology to be
imported is also a "must-clause" in a technology transfer
contract. 79 If there is no "reasonable" provision on the
"guaranty of technological level and economic effect,
including guaranty of the quality of the product
manufactured by the imported technology", the contract will
not be approved by the Chinese approving authority.80
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The Chinese law also requires that licensor guarantee
the "completeness and accuracy" of the transferred
technology or documents, and guarantee that the intended
"technological goal" be achieved by the transfered
technology. 81 In addition, the submission of technical
documents should be timely enough to accomodate the
operation of the plant.82 Since these terms are quite
ambiguous, the parties are well advised to define them in
the contract. It has been suggested to the licensor that
the guaranty be qualified by two conditions: 1) that the
licensee follows the instructions of the licensor; 2) that
the licensee's equipment and facilities meet the licensor's
requirements. 83
The period of warranty (if there is any) should also be
specified because the Chinese party tend to expect
maintenance and repair for an indefinite time.84
The Chinese law also requires another warranty be
provided by the licensor, i.e., that the licensor be the
"legitimate owner of the transfered technology", or
guarantee that it have "the right to transfer or license"
said technology.85 This serves as an insurance on the
technology acquired by the Chinese, because if the Chinese
licensee is sued for infringing intellectual property by a
third party while using the technology, the licensor has the
responsibility to answer the claim; and if there is merit in
the claim by the claimant, all damages suffered by Chinese
licensee shall be compensated by the licensor.86
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7. Protection of Licensor's Intellectual Property
It is perhaps the licensor's first and ultimate concern
in granting a license that the technology shall be protected
against infringement by any party in any form, while at the
same time bringing licensor the expected market return. The
enactment of Chinese patent law assured foreign licensor the
protection of their patented technology to some degree.
However, technology protection clauses in the contract are
still necessary to supplement the general and sometimes
ambiguous terms of the patent law. The technology
protection clauses should normally cover the issues of
secrecy, sublicense and assignability of the transferred
technology.
The essence of a secrecy (confidentiality) clause is a
commitment by both parties not to disclose the licensed
know-how to "third parties" unless it otherwise enters the
public domain.87 The Chinese usually prefer a shorter term
for licenses and a short-term secrecy requirement, arguing
that the know-how or expertise is likely to become obsolete
or publicly known in a relatively short time anyway.88 The
Implementing Details stipulates that the confidentiality
period normally should not exceed the term of the licensing
contract. 89 If for special reasons it has to exceed the
term of the contract, explicit provisions should be put down
in the contract as such and reasons be given when applying
for approval of the contract.~ However, if licensor
continues to supply licensee improvements on the originally
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licensed technology, the Chinese licensee will keep
confidential the newly supplied technology even after the
expiration of the original contract, for a period of the
same length as the term of the contract, beginning from the
date when the improvement was supplied. 91
The Chinese want to continue the use of the technology
after the expiration of the contract without paying
additional royalties. Any prohibition of such continuing
use in the contract should be subject to the scrutiny of the
approving authority.92 However, if the technology is
patented by the licensor, and the patent is still valid
after expiration of the contract, the relevant provisions
of the Chinese patent law will govern.~
The problem of negotiating sublicensing and
assignability to a third party is exacerbated by the
difficulty of defining "third party". As noted earlier, the
Chinese negotiating party is often a national FTC, which
represents all of its affiliates and branches nationwide.
If the end-user is not known at the time of negotiation,
provisions should be made limiting the scope or type of end-
user. Even if the end-user is the actual Chinese
negotiating party, explicit provisions specifying its right
to sublicense or assign should be put down in the contract.
Since China is a country with centrally planned economy,
whereby the resources are allocated according to the central
plan, and since China has traditionally resented the
suggestion that proprietary knowledge be withheld from one
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segment or one region to another, such contract provisions
are more than necessary. However, because of the vastness
of the country, it is hardly practical for foreign licensor
to supervise that the technology or know-how would not be
sublicensed or assigned to another Chinese user.
However, the foreign licensor should not be overly
concerned about infringement, since the Chinese begin to
realize the adverse effect of illegal sublicensing and
assigning.~ In order to keep foreign investors coming in,
in recent years, the Chinese have compromised on a lot of
issues, adopting a series of practice close to or more
acceptable to Western sellers. Moreover, as noted earlier,
the Chinese have proved to be faithful to their word once
their agreements are put down in the contract.95
Trademark issues are also critical in a technology transfer
contract. The Chinese trademark law was enacted in 1982 to
protect trademarks registered in China.~ since only
trademarks registered in China will be protected by the law,
the foreign licensors are highly advised to register their
trademarks in China even before the related technology or
equipments are transferred to China. Also, the foreign
party should ensure that the Chinese party will use the
trademark only if it maintains the quality of the product.
The Chinese copyright law was enacted in september 1990
to protect the copyright owner's interests. This indeed is
further good news to foreign investors. However, since the
copyright law is still in its early stage (effective June 1,
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1991), if licensor's copyright is involved in the technology
transfer, the parties are still well advised to negotiate a
contract as the governing law.
8. Prohibition of Restrictive Clauses
In order to protect proprietary information, licensors
often want to restrict licensee in such aspects as quantity
of production, sales channels, and the sale price of
procduct. In fact, one method often used by multinational
corporations (MNEs) to maximize profits from transferring
technology to less developed countries (LDCs) is to include
numerous restrictive business practices and clauses in the
licensing contract.97 One example is the tying clause,
which requires the licensee to buy exclusively from licensor
all unpatented components, supplies and equipment necessary
to manufacture under the license, even when these items can
be bought more cheaply from other sources.98 Other
examples include price fixingj field-of-use restriction
which limits a licensee's right to exploit the subject
matter of a license to one or more specific useSj and export
restrictions.
However, the Chinese, like many other LDCs, has usually
resented the restrictive clauses in the technology transfer
contract. The Chinese Regulation for Control of Technology
Import Contract explicitly prohibits nine kinds of
restrictive clauses in the technology contract without prior
approval. For example, clauses requiring the licensee to
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accept attached conditions unrelated to the contract,
including the purchase of unnecessary equipment or raw
materials (tying arrangement); clauses restricting the
licensee from developing and improving the technology;
clauses imposing unequal conditions for the exchange of
information relating to improvements of the technology.~
The Implementation of The Chinese Joint Venture Law also
prevents the technology exporting party from "putting any
restrictions on the quantity, price or region of sale of the
products that are to be exported by the technology importing
party. ,,100 However, comparing to similar laws in many
other LOCs, these provisions against restrictive clauses are
less restrictive. 101
In practice, the parties may find it difficult to reach
agreements on these issues. If a licensor is prohibited to
place certain restrictions on licensee, the licensor may try
to include in the cost of its technology its projection of
lost sales due to competition by the recipient or it might
simply refuse to sell for fear of creating a new competitor.
However, successful negotiation must be based on compromise
from both sides.
9. Chioce of Law and Contract Interpretation
Since most technology transfer agreements are
negotiated and signed by both parties in China, the
contracts are generally made subject to interpretation under
Chinese law.102 Before the passage of FECL, China has not
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only resisted the governing of foreign law, but avoided the
choice-of-Iaw clause in the contract altogether. The FECL
allows the parties to choose Chinese law or other law for
interpretation and dispute settlement. In the absence of
such a choice, laws of closest connection or international
practice will apply. However, the equity or contractual
joint venture contracts and the contracts of cooperative
exploration and development of natural resources, which are
performed in the territory of China, must be governed by
Chinese law.103
10. Arbitration and Dispute Settlement
Throughout the years, China has developed its
perculiar ways for settling dispute, somehow reflecting its
old maxim: " it is better to enter a tiger's mouth than a
court of law. ,,104
While this is only literal expression, it is true that
the CHinese would try to settle a dispute before it would
even go to arbitration so that litigation could be totally
avoided.
The Chinese methods of settling commercial disputes
are, in their preference: friendly negotiation;
consultation; conciliation; arbitration. Litigation is the
last resort, which usually means the result of their failure
to settle the dispute.
Friendly negotiation are conducted directly between the
parties to a dispute, either by correspondence or in person
183
in China. Such friendly negotiation is not necessarily one
of reaching compromise by making concessions (although
compromise is necessary); rather it is basically carried out
within the terms of the contract. 105
If no settlement can be reached through friendly
negotiations, one or both parties may request the assistance
of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commision (FTAC),106
which will help the parties in reaching a settlement. This
begins the process of consultation. During this process,
both parties will be asked to submit to FTAC an analysis of
their positions, along with all relevant documents and
information. Or the FTAC may gather information and
investigate by itself and then disclose all the information
obtained to both parties. 107 After this fact-finding
process, both parties will be advised (by FTAC) the strength
and weakness of their positions in the dispute so that each
party will reconsider its arguments and claims and negotiate
a friendly settlement. If no settlement is reached, the
process will be repeated before the dispute goes to
conciliation. 108 If no result comes out of the process of
consultation, FTAC will make non-binding recommendations to
both parties for settlement of their dispute. This is again
trying to conciliate the disputing parties in a friendly
manner and avoid formal arbitration. 109
All these processes are intended to reach
reconciliation in such a manner that the business
relationship is allowed to continue in a cooperative spirit,
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instead of by judging the parties. 110 Even if the parties
have decided to go to arbitration at the beginning, the
dispute will go through these processes successively before
it directly goes to arbitration. 111
Despite the strong preference for settling disputes by
friendly negotiation, consultation, and conciliation, the
Chinese usually do put an arbitration clause in their
contract. Some suggest that the arbitration clauses are
included in contracts solely for the purpose of avoiding the
jurisdiction of foreign courts, there being no intent to
arbitrate dispute. 112 A typical arbitration clause would
require:
"All disputes in connection with this contract or the
execution thereof shall be settled through friendly
negotiations. In case no settlement can be reached
through negotiation, the case may then be submitted for
arbitration to the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission
of the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade. The decision of the Arbitration Commision shall
be final and binding upon both parties; neither party
shall seek recourse to a law court or other authorities
to appeal for revision of the decision. ,,113
As can be seen in this typical clause, China used to
insist arbitration take place in China. However, in
increasing occasions, the Chinese have begun to accept
arbitration in a foreign tribunal such as in stockholm,
Geneva, London and Toronto. 114
The role of arbitration in China's commercial dispute
settlement is limited. Although most Chinese contracts
contain arbitration clauses, very few cases of formal
arbitration have actually taken place. During a trip to
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Beijing in 1975, representatives of the American Arbitration
Association were told that during 1974, only one dispute
from all of China's foreign trade contracts was resolved
through arbitration. 115 According to another source,
though thousands of contracts contain Swedish arbitration,
no trade dispute involving China has yet been brought to
Stockholm as of 1987.116
China is now a party to the United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards. Therefore, there is a reason to believe that the
ruling of a foreign arbitral tribunal still generally be
honored if it is fair and does not violate China's public
order.l17 The foreign party may request either CCPIT or a
Chinese law court to assist in the enforcement of the
awards. However, there will probably be more arbitrations
taken place in China than in a third country. If the
arbitration is taken place in China, the Chinese arbitral
tribunal118 will usually adhere to three rules which are
almost the same as the three general principles guiding
China's foreingn trade. These rules are: 1) independence
and initiative; 2) equality and mutual benefit (pertain to
the terms of the contract); and 3) reference to
international practice. 119
Litigation in court is even more rare. Even today, the
Chinese government still resist the jurisdiction of a
foreign court, considering that as a subjugation of its
independence and sovereignty to a foreign country.
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So far most of the disputes have been settled friendly
in the process of friendly negotiation, consultation and
conciliation. The settlement of disputes by friendly manner
can no doubt promote good business relationship besides
avoiding litigation fees. However, some US businessmen are
uneasy over the Chinese dipute resolution system which
seemed to compel "friendly negotiation" in China on Chinese
terms. 120 Dissatisfaction with this system by foreign
sellers and investors has gradually persuaded the Chinese to
adopt a more flexible approach toward dispute settlement by,
for example, allowing more arbitration in third countries.
On the other hand, it is unlikely that CHina will adopt the
American-style adjudicatory proceedings as the major
channels of dispute settlement. Attempts to impose American
style litigation on the Chinese should be avoided, "if for
no other reason than that it would be culturally
offensive •••121
As one commentator pointed out, "what will determine
the success or failure of the drive for foreign investment
will not be the number and nature of disputes which arise,
but rather the manner in which they are settled •••122 This
is true not only for attracting foreign investment, but also
for importing foreign technology. If disputes are settled
in a fair and reasonable manner, long term business
relations will be maintained; if settled in an arbitrary
manner which favors the local partner, foreign investors and
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sellers will likely withhold their investment and
technology.
11. Tax
A comprehensive discussion of tax regulations is
outside the scope of this thesis. Yet a brief guide to
Chinese tax regulations may be useful to provide a licensor
with some guidance.
Of direct concern are the following tax regulations:
1) Interim Provisions of the Ministry of Finance
Concerning the Reduction or the Exemption from Income Tax on
Royalties for Proprietary Technology, ("Tax on Royalties")
(implemented from January 1, 1983);123
2)Interim provisions of the Ministry of Finance
Concerning the Reduction or Exemption of Income Tax on
Interest Derived from China by Foreign Business ("Tax on
Interest Derived in China") (implemented from January 1,
1983);
3) the Individual Income Tax Law of the People's
Republic of China ("Individual Income Tax Law") (September
10, 1980) and its implementation rules (December 14 1980);
4) the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China
Concerning Foreign Enterprises ("Foreign Enterprise Income
Tax Law", December 13, 1981) and its implementation rules
(February 21, 1982);
5) the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China
Concerning Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures ("Joint Ventures
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Income Tax Law", September 10, 1980) and its implementation
rules (December 14, 1980);
6) Interim Regulations of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China Concerning Reduction or Exemption
of Enterprise Income Tax and Industrial and Commercial
Consolidated Tax in Special Economic Zones and 14 Coastal
Port Cities ("SEC and Port Cities Tax") (November 15, 1984).
In addition, a number of provisions in various joint
venture regulation and technology import regulations offer
tax incentives to foreign investors who bring advanced
technology to China. For example, the newly promulgated
provisions of the State Council of the PRC For the
Enforcement of Foreign Investment ("The 22 Provisions",
October 11, 1986).1~
Instead of by one tax code, the Chinese tax regulations
are made up by pieces of regulations. It may lack
comprehensiveness and integrity, therefore, the foreign
licensor should consult all relevant regulations in drafting
its tax plan and check with the Chinese authority in case of
conflicting or ambiguous provisions.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
In doing business with China, the contract is an
important instrument which may be "the law" governing an
individual transaction. This is true especially for an area
exist, the contract may still be the governing document,
where there is no governing law. -(,Even a governing law does
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since many Chinese law and regulations consist of general
principles only.
The Chinese tend to use their standard form contract.
The national Foreign Trade Corporations (FTCs) are the major
players in foreign trade negotiations. Often they act as
middlemen for their affiliates and branches nationwide and
they co-sign the contracts, although they may not be the
ultimate end-users. During the negotiations, the Chinese
strongly uphold their foreign trade principles (the
principle of independence, equality and mutual benefit, and
taking into consideration of international practice).
Throughout the years, the Chinese have developed their own
negotiation styles and have gained a reputation as tough
negotiators. However, during recent years, the Chinese have
adopted more flexible approaches, which made their practices
more close to and acceptable by Western sellers. This can
also be seen from the different provisions in recent
contracts regarding inspection, choice-of-law, and
especially regarding arbitration and dispute settlement,
where more contracts containing third country arbitration
are signed.
The successful negotiation of a technology transfer
contract will depend on a lot of elements. Given the
remarkable difference of culture and legal system between
China and the West, it is often difficult to reach an
agreement. However, as more and more technology are
transfered to China, both parties will gain experience in
dealing with each other, which will hopefully make the
negotiations easier for both sides.
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provisions of the Andean Common Market (ANCOM) provided in
"Decision 24 of the Commision of the Cartaaena Aareement.
Common Regime of Treatment of Foreian CaDital and of
Trademarks. Patents. Licenses and Rovalties", Dec. 31, 1970.
Registro Official (R.O.) No. 264 (Ecuador), reprinted in II
Intll Legal Mats. 126 (1972).
102. Theroux, supra note 1, at 236.
103. FECL, art. 5. reprinted in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING
BUSINESS WITH CHINA 1986 (Eugene A Theroux ed 1986) at 675.
104. Note, II PRC: Compensation Trade ", supra note 74, at 260.
105. Note, supra note 2, at 1246.
106. FTAC is one section of the Department of Legal Affairs of
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade
(CCPIT).
107. Note, II PRC: Compensation Trade II supra, note 74, at 264.
108. Id. Examples of successful settlements by consultation
are also presented in this article.
109. Most disputes would have been settled by this stage,
because FTAC has already been familiar with the disputes, and
its recommendations will be very similar to the outaome of an
arbitration. For examples of successful settlements by FTAC
conciliation, see ide at 265-266.
110. Id. at 261.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 260. II it is not uncommon to find that disputes
which arise in the sale of goods are settled by one party
giving the other a better in a later transaction ••• (for
example) give lower prices in subsequent transactions without
admitting liability II
113. Id.
114. Chwang & Thurston, Technoloav Takes Command: The Policy
of the Peo'Plels ReDublic of China with ReSDect to Technoloav
Transfer and Protection of Intellectual ProDertv, 21 The Lnt 11
Law. 129, 166 (1987). (hereinafter II Technology Takes Command
"). The Chinese are more willing to accept foreign sites for
arbitration if the foreign party is defendant.
115. Tobert, supra note 4, at 1119.
--,
1
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116. united states Congress, Joint Economic Committee. China's
Economv Looks Toward the Year 2000. --Economic ODenness in
Modernizing China (vol.21, (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1987) at 297.
117. Chen, An. To ODen Wider. or To Close Again: China's
Foreian Investment Policies and Laws, 6 N.Y. L. School J.of
Int'l & Compo L. 1, 20 (1984). see also Chwang & Thurston,
"Technology Takes Command", supra note 114, at 166.
118. The main Chinese arbitral tribunals are FTAC and Maritime
Arbitration Commision of CCPIT.
119. Chwang & Thurston, supra note 114, at 116. Some foreign
observer has noted that in important and complex cases, the
Chinese government may cut in and guide the Arbi tration
Committee so that it acts "reasonably and correctly". supra
note 2, at 1238.
120. Theroux, supra note 1, at 238.
121. Note, "PRC: Compensation Trade", supra note 74, at 270.
122. Id. at 259.
123. All regulations listed here are reprinted in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA 1986 (Eugene A. Theroux
ed 1986), except otherwise noted.
124. reprinted in Technology Transfer to China, supra note 18,
at 107.
CONCLUSION
Technology transfer is one of the major international
transactions today. It has a significant impact on the
world economy. As Professor Wilner pointed out,
"the economic impact of transfer of technology
transactions has been recognized as significant in
all countries, including the most prosperous
industrial countries of the West ••• for countries
whose dependency on foreign technology is great,
it is now universally understood that the impact
of the terms and conditions of its transfer is
felt not only by the party acquiring the
technology but by the acquiring country's economyin general. ,,1
China and the United States represent almost two
extremes in the development of technology: one
technologically backward and one advanced. Besides, the
two countries have tremendously different social,
ideological and cultural systems. It is the magic of
technology that had linked these two countries and such a
link is becoming an increasingly stronger commercial,
cultural and political tie.
The transfer of technology from the United States to
China can be better seen both bilaterally and
multilaterally. China needs technology to fuel its drive
for its "Four Modernization" program. It has adopted
various policies based on its own interest and is developing
200
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a legal framework that will facilitate its import of
technology from different suppliers. It will acquire most
technologies from Japan or Europe even if the united states
does not sell technology to China; obviously, the Unites
states realize that it is in its own interest to sell its
technology to China.
Although at present the United states, along with other
Western countries, still maintains controls on exports of
technology to China, as more and more technologies are
transfered to China, the current suspicion and fear existing
in the West will be replaced by trust and good will. On the
other hand, the successful modernization of China by using
modern technology will not only benefit the United states,
but the whole world, for a modern, industrial China will not
only contribute to the development of human technology, but
to the peace of the world.
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